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MARITAL STATUS AND ELIGIBILITY FOR
FEDERAL STATUTORY INCOME BENEFITS:
A HISTORICAL SURVEY
Marjorie Dick Rombauer*

In an era when attitudes toward marriage institutions are changing'
and it has become a truism that governmentally dispensed benefits
constitute "the new property," 2 the extent to which marital status is a
determinant of the right to receive such benefits is a subject of particular interest. The purpose of this article is to survey that subject.
More specifically, this article will trace congressional and administrative efforts to arrive at acceptable definitions of who should be
treated as a wife/widow (or husband/widower), so as to be entitled to
particular statutory benefits, and similar efforts to define when the status-relationship has become so attenuated or remote as to justify suspension or termination of the benefit payments. Considered in detail
will be definitions under veterans' compensation and pension laws,
under the so-called "insurance" provisions of the Social Security Act,
and under the Railroad Retirement Act, statutes which represent a
range of types of income maintenance legislation and funding sources.
Substantial emphasis will be placed on the historical development of
the definitions for each of these laws and on the stated reasons for particular inclusions or exclusions. The approach will frequently be uncritical, the primary objective being to determine what the law has
been and is rather than to suggest what it should be. While the benefits
and eligibility requirements of these laws will be summarized, the
summaries are provided for background purposes only and are not
intended to be exhaustive. Other laws will be discussed summarily for
comparative purposes.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1958; J.D., 1960, University
of Washington.
1. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note;
Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. 441 (1976); Foster, Marriage and
Divorce in the Twilight Zone, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 462 (1975); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1169 (1974); A Symposium on the Uniform Marriageand Divorce Act, 18 S.D.L. REV. 531 (1973).
2. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ.733 (1964).
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The article is confined to discussion of marital status as it affects
receipt of benefits by a spouse or, more often, by a surviving spouse.

The existence of spousal status or of a recognized marital relationship
may also affect whether or upon what proof a "child" or a "parent"
will be entitled to similar benefits, but no attempt has been made to
identify the interrelation. In particular, no attempt has been made to
discuss problems of discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate
children 3 and between male and female spouses, 4 questions that only
recently have been addressed by Congress and the courts. The ultimate focus will be on situations where failure to enter into a tradi-

tional marriage relationship may result in spouses' loss or "gain" of
federal statutory benefits and on the variant results possible under the
different benefit laws reviewed. Finally, the directions of change in the
last two decades will be summarized.
I.

VETERANS' INCOME BENEFITS

Veterans' benefit legislation preceded other social welfare legislation in the United States by more than a century. One of the early resolutions of the first Congress in 1776 provided for monthly payments
of up to half pay to officers, soldiers, and seamen disabled in the line
of duty and importuned the Colonies' legislative bodies to make pay-

3. See, e.g., Alito, Equal Protection and ClassificationsBased on Family Membership, 80 DICK. L. REV. 410 (1976); Note. Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 479 (1974). But see Mathews v. Lucas. 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976) (6-3)
(upholding constitutionality of dependency presumptions based on factors that excluded
certain illegitimate children).
4. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb. 45 U.S.L.W. 4237 (U.S. Mar. 2. 1977) (challenge
to dependency requirements for widowers under Social Security Act): Kalina v. Railroad
Retirement Bd., 541 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir. 1976) (challenge to similar requirements
under Railroad Retirement Act); Gates. The Social Security Act and the ERA: Facial
Subtle and Systematic Sex Discrimination,3 WOMEN'S RIGHTs L. REP. 13. Sept. 1975.
As for veterans' benefits laws. "wife" and "widow" are the terms usually used in the
statutes, but by congressional fiat these terms include the husband and widower respectively without qualification. 38 U.S.C. § 102(b) (Supp. V 1975) (amending 38 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1970)). Until 1972 the definition required that a husband or widower be
permanently incapable of self-support to come within the terms "wife" or "widow."
Id. (1970) (amended 1972). Dependent widowers were first made eligible for compensation payments under the World War Veterans' Act, 1924. ch. 320. § 201(6). 43
Stat. 607; this eligibility was treated as negated for some dependent widowers by redefinition of "widow of World War veteran" as "a woman" in another section of the
Act, in the amendatory Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 659, § 4. 50 Stat. 660 (repealed
1938). I DEC. ADM'R VET. AFF. 657 (1940); 1 DEC. ADM'R VET. AFF. 637 (1939).
With the Veterans and Survivors Pension Interim Adjustment Act of 1975, Congress
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ments on behalf of the United States. 5 Then in 1789 one of the early
acts of the Congress under the new Constitution provided for continuance of these payments to the disabled veterans of the Revolutionary
Army.6 Monthly payments to veterans for service-connected disabilities have since been provided for veterans of all our country's wars
and conflicts as well as for veterans with peacetime service. Although
protection for survivors of all those who died from service-connected
causes came more slowly, Congress early provided for continuation of
half pay to the widows or children of officers who died as a result of
service-connected wounds while in the service of the new country's
military establishment 7 or navy or marines. 8 Similar benefits were extended to the widows and children of seamen and marines in 18149
and ultimately to classes of survivors of all those who died from service-connected causes.
Those who had not suffered service-connected disabilities were not
completely neglected. By 1818 enough aged veterans of the Revolutionary Army were suffering economic hardships without regard to
service-connected causes to prompt Congress to provide a pension for
any veteran who, "by reason of his reduced circumstances in life,
shall be, in need of assistance from his country for support."' 10 In
1832 a pension without a need requirement was enacted for the benefit of Revolutionary veterans not otherwise provided for;' 1 subsequent legislation provided for continuation of such pension payments
to certain widows of veterans eligible under the 1832 act.' 2 Thus
began a tradition of providing pensions for veterans or their survivors
on the basis of a period of service and need, old age, or non-serviceconnected disability or death. Such payments are still characterized as
"pensions," while payments based on service-connected disability or
has begun a process of substituting the gender-neutral terms "spouse" and "surviving
spouse" for "wife" and "widow," see 38 U.S.C. § 101(3), (31) (Supp. V 1975), but
basic entitlement and other relevant statutes have not yet been similarly neutralized.
5. Resolution of Aug. 26, 1776, reprinted in ARMY AND NAVY PENSION LAWS, AND
BOUNTY LAND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES I (4th ed. R. Mayo 1861) (quoting I J. OF

CONG. 454 (1776)).
6. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95.
7. Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 52, 1 Stat. 390.
8. ActofJan. 29, 1813, ch. 16,§ 11,2Stat. 794.
9. ActofMar. 4, 1814, ch. 20,§ 2,3 Stat. 103.
10. Act of Mar. 18, 1818, ch. 19, § 1,3 Stat. 410.
11. Act of June 7, 1832, ch. 126, 4 Stat. 529.
12. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 189, § 1, 5 Stat. 303; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3,
5 Stat. 127.
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death are called "compensation." 1 3 This distinction is similar to the
distinction between workers' compensation plans and need-based
public assistance plans; its occasional significance in relation to the
subject of this article will be noted at appropriate points.
Under statutes currently in force, marital status may affect the
amount of or eligibility for veterans' income benefits in different ways.
Compensation payments are provided for veterans who are partially
or totally disabled from injury suffered or disease contracted in the
line of duty during either war or peacetime. 14 Such monthly compensation is increased if a veteran has qualifying dependents, with certain
spouses and children under age eighteen presumed to be dependent.
For example, under the 1975 formula, compensation may be increased by $40 a month for a totally disabled veteran who has a qualifying spouse. Statutes currently in force also provide for payment of
dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) to qualified surviving
spouses of veterans who die from a service-connected disability.1 5 The
amounts of the monthly payments range from $241 to $615 under the
1975 formula. 1 6 Pensions based on need and on non-service-connected permanent and total disability (defined as including attainment
of age sixty-five) are also provided for veterans of the modern wars
13. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(13)-(15) (Supp. V 1975). Prior to 1917 the term "pension" was used indiscriminately to describe any regular payments to veterans. Beginning in 1917, though with some vacillation thereafter, Congress began to use the more
descriptive term "compensation" for service-connected disability or death payments.
38 U.S.C.A. note at 24-25 (1959), and the term is now formally defined in the Code
with such a limitation, while "pension" is defined as meaning monthly payments to a
veteran because of service, age, or non-service-connected disability, or to a survivor
because of a non-service-connected death of the veteran. To distinguish pre-1957 benefits from current benefits, a further distinction is made in the above cited definitions
sections between (1) payments to a veteran because of a service-connected disability
and to a survivor because of some service-connected death occurring before January
1, 1957 ("compensation"), and (2) other payments to survivors because of a serviceconnected death ("dependency and indemnity compensation" (DIC)). See, e.g.. id. §
416 (Supp. Dec. 1976). That refinement is disregarded herein, "compensation" being
used in the more general sense stated in the accompanying text.
For a fuller overview of the early legislation for the war-disabled, see Helm. Federal
Legislation for the Relief of World War Disabled, 12 Ky. LJ. 185 (1924). For more
comprehensive early history of veterans' benefits legislation generally. see 38 U.S.C.A.
note at 1-25 (1959); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON VETERANS' PENSIONS, VETERANS'
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 33-46 (1956).

14. 38 U.S.C. §§ 310 (wartime), 331 (peacetime) (1970) (discharge must not
have been dishonorable and disability must not result from the veteran's wilful misconduct).
15. Id. § 410 (covering deaths subsequent to December 31, 1956; veteran's discharge must not have been dishonorable).
16. Id. § 411 (Supp. V 1975) (amending 38 U.S.C. § 411 (1970)). The amount
payable is dictated by the deceased veteran's pay grade.
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and conflicts.' 7 The amount of these pensions may be increased in
some circumstances if the veteran is married 18 and may be decreased
by attribution of the spouse's income to the veteran.' 9 Needy surviving
spouses of veterans who die of causes not related to service may also
20
qualify for pensions.
The foregoing examples sufficiently illustrate the present significance of establishing the existence of a qualifying spousal or marital
relationship under veterans' benefit laws. If such a relationship can be
proved, the date on which it came into existence may also be significant, because the phrase "surviving spouse" is defined in terms of time
or duration of marriage (unless a child was born to the parties either
before or after the marriage) and continuity of cohabitation from date
of marriage to death of the veteran for both compensation and pen2
sion eligibility purposes. '
The starting point for identifying a qualifying spousal or marital
relationship is the existence of a "valid" marriage to a veteran. A
statute currently identifies the law which is to govern whether a marriage is valid 22 and attempts to defi ie those invalid marriages that
may nevertheless be treated as valid for some purposes.2 3 Statutes also
define "surviving spouse" to exclude one who has remarried or who
has established a meretricious relationship with another of the oppo17. Id. §§ 502(a), 521 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
18. Id. § 521(c) (Supp. V 1975). To qualify, in general, the veteran must satisfy
a service requirement of at least 90 days during one or more of the 20th century wars
or conflicts in which this country has been involved. Id. § 521(g) (1970 & Supp. V
1975). The pension is payable only if the veteran's income is below the annual limit
imposed by id. § 521(c) (Supp. V 1975) (under 1976 rates, $4,500 for a married
veteran), with a possible net worth limitation, id. § 522 (1970).
19. Id. § 521(f).
20. Id. § 541 (Supp. V 1975). In general, the veteran must have satisfied the 90day service requirement or must have been receiving or entitled to receive serviceconnected disability compensation, and the surviving spouse must satisfy annual income
and net worth limitations. Id. § 521.
21. See Id. § 101(3) (defining "surviving spouse" as a spouse who has lived with
a veteran "continuously from the date of marriage to the date of the veteran's death
(except where there was a separation which was due to the misconduct of, or procured
by, the veteran without the fault of the spouse)"); id. § 101(31) (defining "surviving
spouse" as including a widow or widower); id. §§ 302, 404 (1970) (requiring for
compensation eligibility marriage within 15 years after veteran's qualifying service terminated or marriage for one year before veteran's death); id. § 541(e) (Supp. V
1975) (requiring for pension eligibility, for Mexican border or World War I veterans,
marriage before December 14, 1944; for World War II veterans, marriage before
January 1, 1957; for Korean conflict veterans, marriage before February 1, 1965; or,
for Vietnam era veterans, marriage before May 8, 1985; or, in the alternative for any
veteran, marriage for one year before the veteran's death).
22. Id. § 103(c) (1970).
23. Id. § 103(a).
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site sex 24 and define the effect to be given termination of either type of
relationship. 25 The origin, purposes, and interpretation of these provisions will be the subject of the remainder of this part.
Determining Whether a MarriageIs or Was Valid-Proofand
Governing Law

A.

The presently controlling statute provides:
In determining whether or not a woman is or was the wife of a veteran, their marriage shall be proven as valid for the purposes of all
laws administered by the Veterans' Administration according to the
law of the place where the parties resided at the time of the marriage
or the law of the place where the parties resided when the right to
benefits accrued. 6
Early legislation provided no similar guiding rule, nor did it prescribe how a marriage should be proved. Because early legislation
providing compensation for disabled veterans did not vary the amount
payable on the basis of whether a particular claimant had one or more
dependents, 2 7 that a veteran had a "wife" was not significant until
after he died. The question then was whether he left a "widow" surviving, since the standard approach in the early legislation providing for
survivors was to make the widow the primary recipient and to continue payments to the veteran's children, if any, should the widow die
or remarry.
The first rule of evidence relating to proof of marriage was established by the President under the Revolutionary War widows' pension
act of 183628 and published by the War Department. It provided
simply that " [t] he legality of the marriage may be ascertained by the
certificate of the clergyman who joined them in wedlock, or the testi-

24. Id. § 101(3) (Supp. V 1975).
25. Id. § 103(d).
26. Id. § 103(c) (1970).
27. The first variable compensation for veterans was provided in the act that established the compensation system for the World War I service personnel. Act of Oct. 6.
1917, ch. 105. § 302, 40 Stat. 398 (providing $30 monthly compensation for a single
veteran, $45 for a veteran with a wife but no children). The same act also provided
variable compensation for widows of veterans, but such provision for dependents had
been made as early as 1866, in the Act of July 25, 1866, ch. 235. § 2. 14 Stat. 230 (an
additional $2 per month per child under age 16).
28. Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 362, 5 Stat. 127.
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mony of respectable persons having knowledge of the fact. '29 The
rule was applicable to proof of marriages contracted prior to 1783
(the cut-off date for marriages covered by the 1836 act),3 0 and the
singularity of documentary proof mentioned may reflect an assumption that marriage ceremonies in colonial times were commonly performed by clergymen. 31 In an Attorney General's opinion dated August 18, 1837, however, the Secretary of War was advised that formal
solemnization of a marriage by a minister of religion was not required
in New York during the Revolutionary War (or in the State of New
York thereafter); in fact, marriage, being a civil contract under the
laws of New York, could be contracted in the presence of any competent witness. 32 Given the Secretary's solicitation of advice with respect
to the law of a particular colony, it would seem that the first administrator of the pension laws had moved rather quickly to application of
differing laws of the different colonies for the determination of marital
status in particular cases. In any event, the rules of evidence prescribed by the President for determinations under the 1838 pension
law (providing for Revolutionary War widows whose marriages might
have taken place as late as 1794)33 called for record proof whenever it
could be obtained, but recognized that it might be found in town,
34
county, parish, church, or family records.
In the 1846 appropriations act for payment of the Revolutionary
War pensions, Congress itself finally legislated a rule of proof requiring "such proof as would be sufficient to establish the marriage
between the applicant and the deceased pensioner in civil personal
actions in a court of justice. '3 5 Twelve days after the enactment the
Commissioner of Pensions requested an interpretation, and the At29.

War Department Rule (July 9, 1836), reprinted in ARMY AND NAVY PENSION

LAWS, AND BOUNTY LAND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES app. III, at 589 (4th ed. R.

Mayo 1861).

30. For a description of the 1836 and 1838 acts providing pensions for widows of
certain Revolutionary War veteran-pensioners, see notes 68-73 and accompanying text
infra.
31. If so, the assumption was inaccurate. For a survey of colonial marriage laws,
see 0. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

ch. 5 (1922).
32. 3 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 287 (1852).
33. See notes 68-73 and accompanying text infra.
34. Pension Office Rule (July 17, 1838), reprinted in ARMY AND NAVY PENSION
LAWS, AND BOUNTY LAND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES app. III, at 593 (4th ed. R.
Mayo 1861).
35. Act of May 7, 1846, ch. 13, § 2, 9 Stat. 5. This provision appears not to have
been discussed in either the House or Senate at the time of adoption of the appropriations bill. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 388, 401, 667, 753 (1846).
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torney General's Office supplied it: The Commissioner could not require "proof of a marriage in fact."'36 In all civil personal actions general reputation and cohabitation were sufficient evidence of marriage;
37
but as this was presumptive evidence only, it could be rebutted.

Primary reliance on the presumption of marriage based on reputation
and cohabitation could have gone a long way toward minimizing the
variant treatment of similar cases that was to be produced by developing differences among the state laws on marriage, particularly in

treatment of nonceremonial (common law) marriages. 38 Unfortunately the congressional directive respecting proof was not repeated
for other pension or compensation laws, and the administrators re39
turned to looking first for record proof of marriage.
In 1882 Congress provided a rule as to the governing law that parallels the current rule for determining the validity of veterans' marriages: "That marriages . . .shall be proven in pension cases to be
legal marriages according to the law of the place where the parties resided at the time of marriage or at the time when the right to pension
accrued . ... "40 The 1882 enactment appears to have been intended
primarily to clarify what law should be applied in determining
whether there was a remarriage that would result in disqualification of
36. That is. proof of the fact of marriage by direct testimony, by the marriage
register, or by any other evidence not derived from the presumed innocence of a cohabitation reputed to be matrimonial was not required. I J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 485 (6th ed. 1881). See also id. (4th ed. 1864).

37.
38.
§ 2.4,
North

40P.ATT'Y GEN. 496(1852).
See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
at 49 (1968); Lynch. Social Security Encounters Comnmnon-Law Marriage in
Carolina, 16 N.C.L. REV. 255. 274-76 (1939) (discussing Social Security Board's

willingness to accept such evidence if no serious dispute as to existence of marriage);
Young. An Evaluation of Washington Marriage Laws, 12 WASH. L. REV. 112. 116-19
(1937); Comment. The Evidential Force of Habit and Repute As Opposed to the
Substantive Law Concerning Marriage, I WASH. L. REV. 277 (1925).
39. See, e.g., A. BROWNING, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PENSIONS. PATENTS, BOUNTIES AND OTHER APPLICATIONS BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 17-18

(1893) (elaborate listing of possible records for Civil War general pension law); id.
at 46 (requiring verified transcript from church or public record or evidence of two
eyewitnesses to marriage for Civil War non-service-connected pension); MANUAL OF
THE PENSION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (1862) (Commissioner's
instructions for proof of marriage under Civil War general pension law, requiring certificate of clergyman or testimony of respectable persons having knowledge of fact).
40. Act of Aug. 7, 1882. ch. 438. § 2. 22 Stat. 345. A widow's pension "accrued"
upon death of the husband. See Stella A. Mellen. 15 Interior Dec. Pension & Bounty
Land Claims 459. 461 (1905). Excepted were marriages "such as are mentioned in
section 4705 of the Revised Statutes." The reference is to a section adopted originally
in 1864 to provide for "colored" soldiers who had been married in states wherein
slaves' relationships could not be legally solemnized. Extended to Indians also in 1873.
the section provided that their marriages could be evidenced by "satisfactory proof
that the parties were joined in marriage by some ceremony deemed by them obligatory.
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a former widow for a pension, 4 1 but it also directly stated for the
first time what law should be applied in determining whether a widowapplicant was the "widow" of the deceased veteran. By 1882 leading
American authorities agreed that state courts generally looked to the
law of the place where a marriage was celebrated in deciding questions of status-capacity to marry and validity of marriage-except, perhaps, in incest and polygamy cases and other cases involving
intentional evasion of significant domiciliary restrictions. 42 There is
no reason to believe that the 1882 enactment was intended to negate
or habitually recognized each other as man and wife, and were so recognized by their
neighbors, and lived together as such up to the date of enlistment, when such soldier
or sailor died in the service, or, if otherwise, to date of death ...."
Although the current statute parallels the 1882 statute except as currently limited to
determining the validity of veterans' marriages, the same provision has not applied to
all cases throughout the intervening period. Essentially the same provision was initially
adopted for the compensation cases of World War I widows under Act of Oct. 6, 1917,
ch. 105, § 22(5), 40 Stat. 398, but the 1924 law, World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch.
320, tit. II, 43 Stat. 607, which repealed and replaced the 1917 law, contained no
parallel provision with respect to governing substantive law, although it did provide
for proof of marriage by "such testimony as the director [of the newly created United
States Veterans' Bureau] may prescribe by regulations." Id. § 20. By Act of Aug. 16,
1937, ch. 659, § 4(c), 50 Stat. 660, the definition of "widow of World War veteran"
was amended to include a three-pronged test of validity: "All marriages shall be
proven as valid marriages according to the law of the place where the parties resided
at the time of marriage, or of the law of the place where the ceremony was performed
at the time thereof, or the law of the place where the parties resided when the right to
pension hereunder accrued." Reference to the law of the place of marriage was removed
in the 1938 version, Act of May 13, 1938, ch. 214, § 2, 52 Stat. 352. Under the consolidation and revision of the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, §
101(3), 71 Stat. 83, the marriage relationship to a veteran was determined under "the
law of the place where the parties resided when the marital relationship began or
ended." The current language as quoted in the text was incorporated in the 1958
consolidation and enactment of title 38, Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, §
103(c), 72 Stat. 1105, with no express provision for remarriage cases. No explanation
or acknowledgement of the changes was found. The primary effect of removal of the
law of the place of ceremony as a reference is to put in question the validity, for
veterans' law purposes, of marriages celebrated in other than the state of residence of
the parties in order to evade marriage restrictions evidencing strong policies of that
state. See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 2.9, at 84-86 (1968) (discussion of choice of law when restriction being evaded is
an age restriction). See also notes 42-43 infra.
41. At least one authority so concluded, influenced by the second clause of the
section, which provided for termination because of open and notorious adulterous
cohabitation, see notes 116-18 and accompanying text infra, Mary E. Miller, 1 Interior
Dec. Pension Claims 171, 173 (1887). The explanation in the House of Representatives
of the bill containing the section supports this conclusion, though it is somewhat garbled. 13 CONG. REC. 6963 (1882) (remarks of Rep. Browne). For discussion of the
circumstances that required statement of a rule for remarriages, see notes 112-15 and
accompanying text infra.
42. 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE

§§ 370389 (6th ed. 1881) (also noting Massachusetts statute making void those marriages
contracted elsewhere in order to evade Massachusetts marriage restrictions); J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 89, 113-113a (7th ed. 1872).
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the basic choice of law principle; therefore, the law of the place of
celebration, if other than the place of residence, was regarded as part
43
of the controlling law of residence.
From a long-range viewpoint, the 1882 enactment put to rest the
possibility that an exclusively federal rule could be fashioned for determining relationships for federal veterans' income benefit laws. The
twin evils of primary reliance on state law-lack of clarity in the laws
of the many states and lack of consistency among the laws of the several states-became more apparent with the passing years. 44 In particular, whether and under what circumstances nonceremonial (common
law) marriages were recognized under the laws of particular states
became troublesome questions for those charged with administration
of the veterans' compensation and pension laws-questions that were
not quickly settled with passing years. 45 The questions may be more
easily answered today, because the number of states in which nonceremonial marriages are recognized has diminished substantially in the
last three decades. A recent count identified only fourteen states (and
the District of Columbia) in which such marriages are still recognized,
and the courts are now in general agreement as to the necessary requirements for recognition. 46 Although state courts are not similarly
43. Wright. Marriage and Divorce, in 19 Interior Dec. Pensions & Bounty Land
Claims 327, 331 (1905) ("Of course, as a general proposition, the courts of the place
of domicil will decide the issue according to the lex loci contractus."). "Resided" was
construed to mean "domiciled." Id. at 331-32.
44. For an index to the many decisions of the Administrator respecting the law of
the various states, see id. at 343-74.
45. One of the early discussions of guiding principles under the 1882 statute appears
in an opinion rendered by an Assistant Secretary of the Interior in the case of Thankful Morse, I Interior Dec. Pension Claims 56 (1887):
In many, if not all the states of the Union, statutes have been adopted providing
in what manner and by whom the marriage contract may be solemnized ....

But

these statutes do not confer the right, they simply provide for the mode of entering into such contracts; and, unless it is expressly provided by statute that marriage
not entered into in conformity therewith shall be void, all marriages entered into
in accordance with the common law per verba de presenti [that is. by present
agreement], although not in conformity with such statutes, or solemnized by persons therein mentioned, are valid and binding. This has become the settled doctrine
of the American courts with but few cases of dissent.
Id. at 57. Today the majority rule appears to be to the contrary: Statutes establishing
a scheme of licensing, solemnization, and other regulations are viewed as mandatory.
H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.4. at 46-47
(1968).
The frequency with which questions about common law marriages arose in connection with applications to the United States Veterans' Bureau during World War I led
an associate counsel in the Bureau to write a book on the subject. See 0. KOEGEL
COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8 (1922).
46. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §

2.4, at
45-46, 48-49 (1968). In 1931 it was asserted that such marriages were still recognized
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in agreement with respect to the type of evidence that will suffice to
establish the elements of nonceremonial marriages, 47 the evidentiary
variations probably do not have significant impact, given administrative power to prescribe by regulation what evidence is acceptable to
establish marriage. 48 Nevertheless, continuing variations in state laws
governing marriages cast continuing doubt on the wisdom of a rule
that makes eligibility for, or the amount of, veterans' income benefits
dependent on the law of domicile at two possible operative times or,
in most cases, on the law of the place of marriage. The possibilities for
unequal treatment have, however, been substantially mitigated by an
exception written into the veterans' compensation and pension laws.
This exception will now be examined.
B.

When an Invalid Marriage Will Be Treated As Valid

If a nonceremonial marriage is not recognized for benefit purposes,
it can at least be said that the parties exercised choice in deciding not
to follow traditional formalities. The more difficult cases are those in
which the parties have participated in a ceremony that would ordinarily result in a valid marriage, but does not because of a reason
unknown to one or both of the parties--the so-called "impediment"
cases. The most common impediment to a valid marriage is nondissolution of a prior marriage. The already married party may justifiably'
believe that a divorce terminated the former marriage or may simply
conceal the former undissolved marriage from the other party. Other
common impediments include limitations on remarriage under divorce laws (such as restrictions on remarriage within a specified time
period), limitations on who may marry (such as age restrictions), and
restrictions on marriage between related parties (such as prohibitions
on marriage between cousins).
The Veterans' Administration conducted a study of such cases and
concluded that the hardship on individual widows who had been denied benefits justified an exception to the rule requiring a valid marriage. Although Congress had previously made exceptions to the valid
in more than half the states. J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DoMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 20-22, at 51-53 (1931).
47.

H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.4, at

48 (1968).
48. 38 U.S.C. § 210(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For current proof rules, see 38
C.F.R. § 3.205 (1975).
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marriage rule only in very limited circumstances, 49 it accepted the
Administration's recommendation and in 1957 adopted a "legal
impediment" exception. This exception required "a marriage . . .
which, but for a legal impediment, would have been valid," entered
into by the claimant "without knowledge of any legal impediment,"
followed by cohabitation with the veteran for five or more years immediately before the death of the veteran (or for any period of time if
a child was born of the purported marriage). 50 If these requirements
were met, then the purported marriage would be deemed to be a valid
marriage, provided that no claim was filed by a legal widow found to
be entitled to such benefits. In 1967 the required period of cohabitation was reduced to one year, but otherwise the requirements are as
summarized. 51 The exception applies to claims for "gratuitous death
benefits," a term not defined in the statutes, but intended to include
52
both compensation and pension payments to widows.
The provision has been liberally construed. Because in all hardship
cases discussed in the Veterans' Administration study the impediment
had been a prior valid and undissolved marriage, it was subsequently
argued that the impediment provision should be limited to validating
marriages only in such cases. The Attorney General rejected this argument in an interpretation of the provision rendered in 196153 and also
rejected the argument that the phrase "without knowledge of any legal
impediment" should be restricted to lack of knowledge of the factual
circumstances which caused the impediment. 54 In the case reviewed
by the Attorney General, the parties to the marriage had been first
cousins. Under the laws of the two states in which the claimant had
lived with the veteran, such a marriage was incestuous and subjected
the participants to possible criminal penalties. It was argued, therefore, that validating the marriage for any purpose would do violence
49. E.g., Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, § 22(5), 40 Stat. 398 (providing conclusive
presumption of marriage if a man and woman had lived together in openly acknowledged husband-and-wife relationship during the two years preceding declaration of war
in World War I or, if later, the date of a veteran's enlistment, absent proof of a living
legal spouse) (repealed 1924).
50. Act of Aug. 28, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-209, § 2, 71 Stat. 485.
51. 38 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970). For a comparison with the legal impediment provision of the OASDI title of the Social Security Act, see notes 207-10 and accompanying text infra. For a description of the origins of such provisions, see notes 211-12

infra.
52.
103 CONG. REC. 11714 (1957) (remarks of Rep. Rogers); [ 1957] ADM'R VET.
AFF. ANN. REP. 136.
53.
42Or,.ATT'YGEN. No.3(June 1, 1961).

54.
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to state marriage laws and public morality. This argument was rejected with the reasoning that "l[p] ublic morality as defined in State
laws varies, and for the Federal government to defer to the State standard would, in all such cases, fly in the face of the statutory policy
with regard to uniform benefits." 55 In the following year, the Administrator considered a case in which a claimant had entered into a religious marriage with a veteran in France, but had failed to participate
in the civil ceremony required under French law. The civil ceremony
requirement was found to be a "legal impediment," and the following
broad interpretation was adopted:
The term "legal impediment" . . . must be construed as including not
only (1) particular substantive conditions for validity which may exist
in certain jurisdictions such as those respecting age, race, mental capacity, marital status, and consanguinity, but also, with respect to one
of the commonly accepted forms for creating a marriage (i.e., civil,
religious, common-law, and tribal), (2) the special formalities, or external conduct required of the parties or of third persons, such as
public officers, for the formation of a valid marriage by the laws of a
particular jurisdiction. 56
The Administrator's interpretation is so broadly phrased as to justify a finding that failure to participate in a ceremony required by
state law could be a legal impediment within the exception if the
claimant had in good faith believed that no ceremony was required.
Although the published regulation relating to proof of marriage does
not clearly support this conclusion,5 7 an interpretation circulated for
internal administrative purposes identifies as one possible effect of the
Administrator's interpretation the "possible recognition of a 'commonlaw' marriage consummated in good faith in one of the several States
that do not recognize [such marriages] .-58 The claimant's statement
of lack of knowledge of an impediment will be accepted as proof of
59
that fact, absent information to the contrary.
55.
56.

Id. at 5.
Vet. Adm'r Dec. No. 979, at 3 (Apr. 2, 1962).

57.

See 38 C.F.R. § 3.205 (1975). This regulation requires a signed statement by

the claimant that she had no knowledge of an impediment, in addition to one of several described types of proof of marriage. Id. § 3.205(c). However, the regulation

seems to permit proof of a noncermonial marriage for only those jurisdictions that
recognize marriages other than by ceremony. Id. § 3.205(a)(6).
58.

DEP'T OF VETERANS BENEFITS, VETERANS ADMINISTRATION,

HANDBOOK

FOR

VETERANS BENEFITS COUNSELORS H-27-73-1, at 11-1-9 (rev. 1973).

59.

38 C.F.R. § 3.205(c) (1975).
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Even though the impediment exception to the valid marriage requirement does not negate the effect of all state law variations, the
exception as presently interpreted does go far to protect the good faith
expectations of those surviving spouses who may have failed to effect
a valid marriage because of ignorance of local marriage laws or lack
of knowledge of other factual or legal impediments. Further, it may
directly support the good faith expectations of the veteran in those
cases in which the veteran has asserted his belief in the existence of a
marriage in a statement made in connection with a claim for veterans'
benefits, because such a statement will be accepted as sufficient to corroborate a surviving spouse's certified statement of facts relating to a
"'marriage."' 30 Thus, on balance, the basic rules governing eligibility
for veterans' income benefits appear to be fair despite primary reliance on diverse state laws. One possible exception should, however,
be noted. Although a "widow" may become eligible for compensation
or pension payments even though her purported marriage was not
valid, the same "marriage" cannot make her the "wife" of the veteran
before his death-an anomalous result indeed. The legal impediment
exception being applicable only to claims for death benefits, a veteran
must still establish a valid marriage to be entitled to the increased
compensation or pension and income limits provided for a veteran
with a qualifying spouse. It has been argued that in the interests of
uniformity and "fair play" treatment should be the same both before
1
and after the veteran's death.6
C.

The Effects of Remarriage-Valid, Void, Voidable, or Presumed
-and of Termination Thereof

One of the most consistent features of legislation providing for survivors of veterans has been identification of the widow as the primary
recipient, with payments to be continued to children of the veteran, if
any, "in cases of the death or intermarriage of such widow." Interpreting such language in 1814 legislation, the Attorney General early
ruled that the remarriage provision was not intended to work a forfeiture; thus, a woman who did not apply for a pension on account of
60. Id. § 3.205(a).
61.
See U.S. Veterans Advisory Comm'n, Report on the Veterans Benefits System
66-67 (Mar. 18, 1968). reprinted in Hearing Before the House Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2819-20 (1968).
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her first husband's death in the line of duty until after she had, remarried was found to be entitled to the pension for the interval between
the death of her former husband and her second marriage. 62 Considered and rejected was the argument that widows' pensions were intended for present support of the widow, a necessity that was supposed to exist during widowhood and terminate with remarriage, and
that failure to apply for a pension evidenced absence of necessity. The
response was that a widow's right to a pension did not depend on actual necessity, but rather, "[i] t is in the nature of an absolute engagement or promise made to those officers and men, that if they fall in
the service of their country, so much shall be paid to their wives and
children, without inquiry into the fact whether they stand in need of it
or not." 63 Whether one accepts the premise of the argument or of the
response as the rationale for providing widows' pensions, it is difficult
to justify a termination of the payments because of remarriage without
some consideration of the circumstances of the widow's marriage to
the veteran and of the remarriage (for example, the duration of each).
Termination on remarriage seems even less justified if, as has some-

times been argued, a widow has a claim to a pension in her own
right. 64 Nevertheless, remarriage has consistently been made a termi62. 2 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 1 (1852). As was typical of the early legislation, the act did
not expressly require an application and was therefore construed as creating a vested
right, subject to termination only as of time of remarriage. This reasoning was ultimately carried to its logical limits when the Attorney General concluded that a pension accrued to the date of remarriage was payable even though the "widow" had died
after remarrying without applying for the pension. Opinion of Attorney General (Apr.
5, 1835), reprinted in MANUAL OF THE PENSION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMER-

ICA 167 (1862). Ironically, under the rules of law then governing the right of a husband in property of a wife, it was the second husband who was the appropriate
claimant, id. at 168, even when the widow-wife was still living, 2 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 95,
96 (1852). The rule that the husband could claim the pension on death of the widowwife was changed by Act of June 19, 1840, ch. 39, § 2, 5 Stat. 385. This act was construed as precluding payment of pension arrears to any person if the widow left no
children. 4 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 504 (1852). Currently, under 38 U.S.C. § 3021(a)(3)
(1970), accrued benefits would be payable to the children of the deceased veteran on
death of the widow.
63. 2 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 3-4 (1852). In a seeming reversal of position, on February
9, 1836, a successor advised the Secretary of the Navy to the contrary with respect to
the same pension law: "[T] he pension was intended exclusively for the personal benefit of the widow during her widowhood; and if she neglects to apply for it before her
remarriage, I think it cannot afterwards be claimed ...." 3 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 36-37
(1852). This opinion was quickly withdrawn, however, the author admitting to having
overlooked the earlier 1825 construction. 3 Op. AT'VY GEN. 68 (1852). In this new
opinion, there was complaint that, as on several prior occasions, the earlier decision
seemed to have been based on usage of the Navy Department rather than on the
language of Congress, but the author, Attorney General Butler, bowed to precedent
to obtain uniformity ofjudgment.
64. See notes 83-84 and accompanying text infra. See also 13 CONG. DEB. 1174
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nating event, and the question around which controversy has swirled
is the effect to be given to the termination of a widow's remarriage by
death, divorce, or other form of dissolution.
1.

Valid remarriageterminated by death or divorce

In 1970 Congress enacted a provision for restoration of compensation or pension to a veteran's "widow" upon termination of her remarriage by either death or dissolution by a court with authority to render
divorce decrees, restricted only by the proviso that the divorce must
65
not have been secured through "fraud by the widow or collusion."
The House committee's justification for the provision was that the
remarriage requirements with respect to veterans' benefits were considerably more restrictive than those found in other federally adminis66
tered programs such as social security and civil service retirement.
The Administrator's justification for restoring compensation was more
elaborate:
[H]ardship results if the remarriage is short lived and the widow
emerges from the subsequent marriage in a worse economic position
than before. In many instances, the widow has spent most of her life as
the wife of the veteran, as a housewife and mother, and has been unable to engage in any outside employment to establish entitlement to
retirement or other old age benefits in her own right. The permanent
termination of Veterans' Administration benefits upon her remarriage
at an advanced age frequently places her in precarious circumstances
when death or divorce follows. In these and similar circumstances, it is
reasonable to assume that the veteran would have intended that a measure of support be provided for the widow during any period in which
she is not married.67
(1837) (remarks of Rep. Taylor):
And why, sir, have you extended your pension system to the widows of those who
were entitled to a pension? It is because they. too, have made sacrifices in the cause
of their country; it is because they have endured hardships and encountered dangers for their country's freedom; it is because they have united their fortunes and
identified their interests, from early life, with those who fought your battles. It is
because of the encouragement which they gave and the influence which they
exerted ....
65. 38 U.S.C. § 103(d)(2) (1970).
66. H. R. REP. No. 91-1166, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. 8. reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3723. 3728.
67. Letter from Fred B. Rhodes. Deputy Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. to
Representative Olin E. Teague (Aug. 29. 1969), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 91-1166.
91st Cong.. 2d Sess. 16-17 (1970). and [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3736.
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The legislative trail to acceptance of this position is long and winding.
When Congress extended pension rights to certain Revolutionary
War widows in 1836, it provided for continuance of a pension only
during the time that a widow remained unmarried.6 8 Within less than
a year, however, Congress adopted an "explanatory" act, providing
that the benefits of the 1836 act should not be withheld because a
widow had remarried, provided that she was a widow at the time the
1836 act was passed. 69 In the following year, Congress resolved that
the benefits of the 1836 act "shall not be withheld from any widow
whose husband has died since the passage of the said act, or who shall
70
hereafter die, if said widow shall otherwise be entitled to the same."
In a painstakingly logical opinion that reviewed the progressive expansion of the class of widows benefited by the act, the Attorney General
construed the resolution as permitting payment of pensions to widows
who had remarried but had again become "widows" by the deaths of
their new husbands. 71 In 1838 Congress extended the benefits of the
1836 act to another class of Revolutionary War widows,7 2 again providing for termination in the event of remarriage. In due course, in
1842 Congress provided that remarriage of a widow "shall be no bar"
to a claim for a pension under the 1838 act, provided that she was a
73
widow at the time of making application.
Having thoroughly obscured the meaning of "widow" by the series
of enactments just described, Congress returned to its earliest pattern
of legislating. In compensation and pension acts enacted for the benefit of survivors of veterans of other nineteenth century wars, Con-

68. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 3, 5 Stat. 127 (providing for only those widows
whose marriage to a veteran had taken place before the end of his last period of

service).
69. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 42, § 1, 5 Stat. 187. The benefits of the 1836 act were
extended to widows of persons who had continued in the service until November 3,
1783, and were married prior to that date while the husband was still in the service.
Id.§2.

70.

Res. 7,25th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 Stat. 311 (1838).

71.

30P.AT'Y GEN. 477 (1852).

72. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 189, § 1, 5 Stat. 303 (extending benefits to widows
whose marriages had occurred after the veterans' last periods of service but before

1794).
73.

Act. of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 191, 5 Stat. 521. This provision was, at one point,

apparently interpreted as having no effect on removing the bar to remarriage. See
Pension Office Opinion (Nov. 14, 1842), reprinted in ARMY AND NAVY PENSION LAWS,
AND BOUNTY LAND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES app. II, at 525 (4th ed. R. Mayo
1861). The 1838 act had provided pensions for only five years. It was renewed and

finally extended for life by Act of Feb. 2, 1848, ch. 8, 9 Stat. 210.
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gress provided monthly payments for only those widows "who have
74
not remarried" or "during widowhood.
The earliest attempt to deal directly with the effect of divorce following remarriage apparently came in 1864. Following the onset of
the Civil War, Congress in 1862 adopted the first comprehensive general law, 75 providing for payment of a "pension" to a widow only

"during her widowhood. '76 Within two years it was asserted that differing interpretations of the phrase "during her widowhood" were
being attached for purposes of Army and Navy pension cases. It was
alleged that in Army pension cases payments to widows were merely
suspended during a remarriage and restored should the new husband
die, leaving the claimant a "widow" again, while in Navy cases the
pension payments were not resumed after a remarriage was terminated by death.7 7 The belief that such variant treatment existed
prompted a proposal that remarried widows be restored to the pension
74. Acts providing compensation (i.e., for service-connected deaths) include the
following: Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 362, § 1, 5 Stat. 127 (those dying subsequent to
April 20, 1818), as amended by Act of July 21, 1848, ch. 108. 9 Stat. 249 (extending
coverage to those serving in War with Mexico); Act of Apr. 16. 1816, ch. 55. § 1, 3
Stat. 285 (War of 1812). All the foregoing were extended for widow's life by Act of
June 3. 1858, ch. 85, 11 Stat. 309. For the Civil War compensation legislation. see
notes 75-80 & 86 and accompanying text infra.
Acts providing pensions (i.e., for non-service-connected deaths) include the following: Act of June 27, 1890, ch. 634, § 3. 26 Stat. 182 (Civil War pension enactment
imposing need requirement on widows for the first time); Act of Jan. 29, 1887. ch. 70.
§ 1, 24 Stat. 371 (War with Mexico); Act of Feb. 14. 1871, ch. 50. § 1. 16 Stat. 411
(War of 1812).
75. Act of July 14, 1862, ch. 166, 12 Stat. 566 (governing payment of compensation for service-connected disability and death for veterans injured or dying after
March 4, 1861).
76. Id. § 2.
77. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3369 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Hendricks).
The asserted difference was apparently disputed by the chairman of the Committee on
Pensions. See id. (remarks of Sen. Grimes). It is difficult to understand how such variant treatment could have developed, if indeed it did. The Office of Commissioner of
Pensions had been created in 1833 and was placed under the direction of the Secretary
of War in 1835, Navy pension affairs being under the authority of the Secretary of the
Navy only until 1840, when they too were transferred to the Office of the Commissioner. In 1849, with the creation of the Department of the Interior, the Pension Office
was transferred to that Department. See Legal History of the Pension Office and Its
Clerical Force Above the Grade of Fourth-Class Clerkships, in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF ARMY AND NAVY PENSIONS AND
BOUNTY-LAND WARRANTS; DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND RULINGS
AND ORDERS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS THEREUNDER 7-8 (F. Curtis & W.

Webster eds. 1885). Given administration of both Army and Navy pensions within the
same department under the same law, one would expect the same interpretation: but
the pre-1862 history of administering different pension laws for the Army and the
Navy could have led to continuation of variations, or the variations in treatment may
actually have been confined to cases under the former variant laws.
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rolls not only upon death, of the second husband, but also in some
cases of remarriage ending in divorce. The proposal came during debate on a bill to amend the new general pension law in the form of a
proposed amendment to that bill.7 8 The proposed amendment was
hardly discussed, however, and the provision for the divorced former
widows was not discussed at all, because it was pointed out that the
proposed amendment was inconsistent with an overlooked section of
the bill as originally proposed: "That on the remarriage of any widow
receiving a pension, such pension shall terminate, and shall not be
renewed should she again become a widow. '7 9 The bill as originally
proposed was in due course adopted.8 0 The language expressly forbidding restoration of a widow's pension after remarriage disappeared in
the comprehensive revision and consolidation of 1873, wherein Congress continued widows' pensions "during her widowhood," 81 providing that "remarriage of any widow . . . shall not bar her right to
such pension to the date of her remarriage . . . [but] on the remarriage. . . such pension shall cease."8 2 This language became section
4708 of the Revised Statutes of 1875.
The effect of divorce following remarriage was finally dealt with
expressly in 1901 in an amendment to section 4708 of the Revised
Statutes. The new provision originated in the House as part of a
narrow proposal for the relief of Civil War service widows-that is,
those who had been wives during the Civil War fighting. The rationale
was that such a woman had stayed at home to take care of the family
and hence "did as loyal service to the Government as the man who
bore the brunt on the battlefield" 83 and thus had "some claim in her
own rights." 84 The Senate broadened the provision to include service
widows of other wars.8 5 The exception remained narrow, however,
covering only widows (1) whose remarriages ended with the death of
78.

CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 3369 (1864) (amendment to H.R. 406,

proposed by Sen. Hendricks) ('That in all cases of second marriage the same construction shall be given to the Navy as is given to the Army pension laws; and divorce
for fault of the husband shall be no bar to the claim of any applicant if she be otherwise entitled.").
79. Id.
80.

Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 247, § 7, 13 Stat. 387.

81. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, § 8, 17 Stat. 566 (codified at REV. STAT. § 4702
(1875)).
82.
83.
84.

Id. § 14.
34 CONG. REC. 2150 (1901) (remarks of Rep. Miers).
Id. (remarks of Rep. Hull).

85.

Id. at 3505.
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the new husband or in divorce on the wife's application, "without
fault on her part," and (2) who were without means of support "other
than their daily labor." 86 There appeared to be some question as to
the propriety of benefiting any divorced former widows, but apparently persuasive was the argument that a widow who had married
some "worthless" man and then had been divorced ought to have her
pension restored. 87 A similarly narrow provision was ultimately
adopted for the compensation benefits of widows of service personnel
of the Spanish-American War, the Chinese Boxer Rebellion, and the
88
Philippine Insurrection.
Narrow though the exception seems, it was not extended to the
remarriage cases of surviving spouses of World War I veterans, for
whom a new compensation system was legislated. 8 9 Passage of time
brought for them only an express provision that "where compensation
is properly discontinued by reason of remarriage it shall not thereafter
be recommenced." 9 0 The World War I system was extended to the

veterans of later wars. : 1 The differing manner of treatment of the
widows of the earlier and later wars continued until 1957, when compensation, pension, and other benefit laws administered by the Veterans' Administration were revised and consolidated into the Veterans,

86. Act of Mar. 3. 1901. ch. 865. § 1, 31 Stat. 1445. as anended by Act of Feb.
28, 1903. ch. 858. 32 Stat. 920 (technical amendment only). Even in their very
old age, Civil War widows were not to escape the consequences of having been adjudged at fault in a divorce action. In providing service pensions for Civil War widows
who had attained age 70, Congress included remarried widows only if their subsequent
or successive remarriages had been dissolved by death or "by divorce on any ground
except adultery on the part of the wife." Act of June 9, 1930. ch. 420. § 3. 46 Stat.
529.
87. 34 CONG. REC. 2150 (1901) (remarks of Rep. Cannon). In the Senate the
stated justification was that the bill would relieve Congress from passing 25-30 private
bills each year to aid those who had become widows again and were in "utter destitution." Id. at 3506 (remarks of Sen. Gallinger).
88. Act of Sept. 1, 1922, ch. 302, § I, 42 Stat. 834. Pensions for these widows
were ultimately conditioned in the same way as were the pensions for Civil War
widows, see note 86 supra. Act of May 1. 1926, ch. 209, § 2, 44 Stat. 382.
89. See Act of Oct. 6. 1917, ch. 105, art. III, 40 Stat. 398 (repealed and replaced
by World War Veterans' Act. 1924, ch. 320, 43 Stat. 607). See also Act of June 28.
1934, ch. 867. § 3(b), 48 Stat. 1281, as amended by Act of Dec. 14. 1944. ch. 581.
§ 6, 58 Stat. 803.
90. Act of May 13. 1938, ch. 214, § 3, 52 Stat. 352.
91. Legislation extending the system to World War II veterans includes the following: Act of May 27. 1944, ch. 207. § 4. 58 Stat. 229; Act of July 13. 1943. ch. 233.
§ 9(a), 57 Stat. 554; Act of Dec. 19, 1941, ch. 598, 55 Stat. 844. Similar legislation
for Korean conflict veterans was passed as SJ. Res. 72. 82d Cong.. Ist Sess.. 65 Stat.
40(1951).

246

Federal Benefits; Marital Status
Benefits Act of 1957.92 In this consolidated Act, the term "widow"
was defined, in part, as one "who has not remarried (unless the purported remarriage is void). '93 There was no provision for restoration
of payments in the event of divorce or of death of the new husband
until the 1970 amendment of the Act quoted at the beginning of this
section.
As the foregoing historical review suggests, modifications of the rule
that benefits terminate absolutely on remarriage have tended to come
as the widows of veterans of particular wars have reached old age.
The 1970 provision is an exception, since it extends not only to the
aged spouses of World War I veterans, but to the aging spouses of
World War II veterans and the younger spouses of veterans of the
more recent conflicts. The Administrator's expansive justifications for
the 1970 provision, quoted at the beginning of this section, seem out
of place in the veterans' benefits setting. For example, if a primary
objective of restoring benefits after termination of a remarriage by
death or divorce is to provide for needy aged persons, then benefits
can be provided through a more limited provision for the aged former
spouses of veterans, as under prior laws. Yet, there appears to be no
compelling reason why a limited class, composed of such former
spouses should be singled out from among the larger class of aged
persons for special treatment, except perhaps a feeling that there is
something unseemly about having a former spouse (generally a
widow) of a veteran dependent on public assistance. Similarly, if a
primary purpose is to protect against the consequences of unfortunate
remarriages generally or to compensate for a stay-at-home spouse's
contributions to a marriage, it is difficult to explain why the former
spouses of veterans should be singled out for such protection. There is
a recognized need for some method of providing for those divorced
persons wh6 have not provided for themselves because of commitment
to traditional spousal or parental roles. This need has also been recognized in relation to the "insurance" benefit provisions of the Social
Security Act; the problem will therefore again be discussed in connection therewith.

92.

Pub. L. No. 85-56, 71 Stat. 83. As subsequently amended, the-ffrovisions were

'extended to veterans of the Vietnam era by Veterans' Pensio-n and Readjustment Assistance Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-77, tit. II, '1Stat. 178.
93.

Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 101(3), 71 Stat. 83.
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The effect of a void or a voidable remarriageand of termination
thereof by annulment

A "remarried" surviving spouse was included in the definition of
"widow" incorporated in the 1957 consolidation of veterans' benefit
laws only if the purported remarriage was void. This new definition
merely expressly adopted an exception that had been appreciated
from early times. 94 The Veterans' Administration 95 recognized an
even broader exception, having worked out an elaborately justified
position statement with respect to both void and voidable marriages
by 1940.96 The statement acknowledged the distinction between void
and voidable marriages-that the former creates no marital status,
while the latter creates a marital status that exists until the marriage is
annulled. 97 Nevertheless, under appropriate circumstances, a widow
who was party to a voidable marriage as well as a widow who was
party to a void marriage could have her pension restored, on the reasoning that an award which had been discontinued because of a validly annulled "remarriage" had not been "properly" discontinued as
required by the statute. 98 A distinction, however, was made as to the
date of restoration of the compensation or pension award: In voidable
remarriage cases, restoration to the rolls could not antedate the date
of a decree of nullity, whereas in void remarriage cases, restoration
might be made as of the date of separation from the "husband" following discovery that the marriage was void, given a decree of nullity
from a court of competent jurisdiction.9 9 When Congress incorporated the void remarriage provision in the statute, a summary of the
Veterans' Administration position was published in the Code of Fed94.

See, e.g., 2 DIGESTS OF LEGAL OPINIONS RELATING TO THE UNITED STATES VET-

ERANS' BUREAU, Digest No. 336 (1926) (precedent file dated 3-7-25; right to compensation is not permanently terminated if marriage is annulled and declared void ab
initio); 14 Op. ATr'y GEN. 220 (1875) (recognizing that marriage to man already
validly married would be void, but finding insufficient evidence of such circumstance
in the particular case); A. BROWNING, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS RELATING TO PENSIONS,
PATENTS.

BOUNTIES AND OTHER APPLICATIONS

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS

91-92 (1893) (if prior wife of second husband is discovered, supposed remarriage is
null and void, and pensioner is entitled to have her pension, with arrears, restored).
95. The original Veterans' Administration was created in 1930 with the authority
to administer the veterans' benefit laws. For a discussion of the 20th century Administration history. including creation of the new Administration, see 38 U.S.C.A. at 4-5
(1959).
96. 2 DEC. ADM'R VET. AFF. 377 (1940).
97. Id. at 379.
98. Id. at 381.
99. Id. at 387.
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eral Regulations, 100 yet no reference to it was made in either the
House or Senate reports describing the effect of the incorporation. In
both reports the explanation for the incorporation of the exception
was that the limited remarriage privileges of widows of the Civil War,
Indian wars, and Spanish-American War should be restricted "in the
interest of uniformity."' 01
Within five years, in 1962, the inadequacies of the summary congressional statement of the effect of a void marriage had become apparent, and it was expanded to provide as follows:
The remarriage of the widow of a veteran shall not bar the furnishing
of benefits to her as the widow of the veteran if the remarriage is void,
or has been annulled by a court with basic authority to render annulment decrees unless the Veterans' Administration determines that the
102
annulment was secured through fraud by either party or collusion.
This amendment not only restored the Administration's pre-1957
treatment of voidable marriages in a manner similar to void marriages, but also incorporated another part of the Administration's
treatment of the problem area that had been overlooked in the earlier
amendment-a possible administrative option to ignore a state court's
decree of nullity if it appeared to have been obtained through fraud or
collusion. Earlier the Administrator had detailed the magnitude of the
problem created by a propensity on the part of some state courts to
grant decrees of nullity when there was no possible basis therefor' 03
and had discussed the "appalling number of cases" in which parties
had used annulment proceedings collusively to secure the restoration
of a widow claimant to the rolls and for other purposes. 0 4 The Administrator had also had published the views of the Office of the Solicitor on the responsibility of the Veterans' Administration to refuse to
recognize a decree of nullity where investigation established unmistakable evidence of collusion or fraud. 0 5 By the 1962 amendment, then,
Congress essentially adopted the former position of the Administra100. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.64(c), 13.402 (1956).
101. H.R. REP. No. 279, 85th Cong., IstSess. 16, reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1214, 1228; S. REP. No. 332, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in
[1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1241, 1248.
102. 38 U.S.C. § 103(d)(1) (1970).
103. 2 DEc. ADM'R VET. AFF. 380 (1940) (apparently relying on Address by
Judge Charles Desmond, Siena College Forum, reprintedas The Annulment Problem,
20 N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL. 59 (1948)).
104. Id.

105.

Id. at 382-84.
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tion except with respect to the time of restoration of a claimant to the
10 6
compensation or pension rolls.
The legislative history does not reflect that this adoption of the pre1957 position of the Administration is what the 1962 amendment

accomplishes. Rather, committee reports and debate reveal an emphasis on the need for uniform treatment in an area of law wherein
state laws differ very substantially.10 7 It is correct that the amendment
will again permit a more nearly uniform treatment of those similar
cases wherein inconsistency under the prior law had been caused by
variance in treatment of the same defect as resulting in a void marriage in some states and a voidable marriage in other states.10 8 It does
not, however, address the lack of uniformity created by variance in
treatment of the same defect as resulting in a void or voidable mar-

riage in some states but neither in other states, 10 9 or by variance in
general availability of annulment proceedings in different states. 110
The amendment as originally proposed would have provided more
precise guidelines as to the types of annulment decrees (of voidable
marriages) that would be recognized, by requiring an annulment by a
court of competent jurisdiction, granted "'on a ground going to the
essentials of the marriage relationship'" to a " 'woman' " who was
either " 'the aggrieved party or was mentally incompetent at the time
of the remarriage.' "111 A House committee amendment removed the
guidelines in order to simplify administrative procedures by making it
106. Under the language of the statutory provision it would seem that a party to
a void marriage should never be deprived of benefits, but the Administrator construed
the 1962 amendments as effecting no change from the former administrative practice
of restoring benefits no earlier than the date on which the parties cease to cohabit. S.
REP. No. 1842. 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2589, 2590. In voidable marriage cases, restoration of benefits is effective as of
the date the annulment decree becomes final only if claim therefor is filed within one
year; otherwise, benefits are restored as of the date of claim. 38 U.S.C. § 3010(k)
(1970).
107. See 108 CONG. REC. 5520-21 (consideration in House). 16103-04 (consideration in Senate wherein excerpt from S. REP. No. 1842, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.. reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2589, merely inserted in Congressional Record) (1962); H.R. REP. No. 1459. 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962).
108. See, e.g., H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 2.9, at 81-82 (1968) (discussion of variety of approaches with respect to marriages
of underaged persons).
109. See, e.g., id. §§ 2.15 (discussion of effect of mental incompetence). .17 (discussion of effect of fraud).
110. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note; id.
§ 208 note; Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH.
L. REV. 375, 390-92 (1974).
111. H.R. REP. No. 1459. 87th Cong.. 1st Sess. 3 (1962). See also 108 CONG. REC.
5520-21(1962).
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unnecessary to conduct investigations and other inquiries on difficult
questions. The committee amendment also resulted in rejection of the
attempt to limit restoration of benefits by a fault test, but the thrust of
the original drafting-identification of a few federally recognized
grounds for avoidance of marriage from among the many variant
state grounds and, thus, much of the desired uniformity-was lost.
3.

The effect of a meretriciousrelationshipand of termination
thereof

Although intentional failure to conform to ceremonial or other
formalities required to perfect a marriage under controlling laws may
disqualify a surviving spouse for compensation or pension purposes,
entering into a meretricious relationship rather than an effective remarriage could have beneficial results if "remarriage" were the only
basis for terminating a living widow's benefits. This possibility had
apparently been recognized well before the end of the nineteenth
century.1 1 2 The Commissioner of Pensions attempted to deal with the
problem by terminating the pensions of those widows found to be
living in a meretricious relationship: "It clearly has been the intent of
Congress at all times

.

.

.

to discountenance the claims of a certain

class of soldiers' widows who dishonor the dead by living in adulterous cohabitation while drawing the pension allowed for the loss of
the husband's support.""13 The Secretary of the Interior reportedly
disagreed, deciding that such cohabitation did not terminate the pension under existing law," 4 though his office may have sanctioned
cutting off pensions on questionable estoppel reasoning or by manipulation of the presumption of marriage based on cohabitation and reputation."15 Congressional response was to provide that the validity of
112. See, e.g., 13 CONG. REC. 6963 (1882) (remarks of Rep. Browne) ("[I]n
many instances it is said ... that widows do not marry, but live in ... improper relations simply because they know that a marriage suspends the payment of the
money.").

113. Commissioner's Ruling No. 113 (June 3, 1885) (denying claim to restoration
of pension), in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF ARMY AND NAVY PENSIONS AND BOUNTY-LAND WARRANTS; DECISIONS OF THE
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR, AND RULINGS AND ORDERS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS

THEREUNDER 19 (F. Curtis & W. Webster eds. 1885). See also A. BROWNING, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS RELATING TO PENSIONS, PATENTS, BOUNTIES AND OTHER APPLICATIONS

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 92 (1893) (counseling applications for restoration of pension by widows so terminated).

114.

13 CONG. REC. 6760 (1882).

115.

No fully reported opinions found adopt these bases for termination of wid-
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marriages should be determined by the law of specified places of
residence' 16 and that "the open and notorious adulterous cohabitation
of a widow shall operate to terminate her pension from the commencement of such cohabitation."' 17 In the House of Representatives
the proponent of the enactment observed that if cohabitation suspended the pension, "that obstruction to marriage [fear of loss of pension] will be removed;" also evidenced was a strong sense of indignation over the possibility of a widow and her paramour living on the
pension given the widow "in consequence of the death of the soldier
husband."' 118 An administrator later advanced a less moralistic rationale for the provision: Assuming that the reason for granting a pension to a widow was to substitute for the husband's presence and
support, forfeiture of the pension upon proof of an adulterous cohabitation was "not merely a penalty to be inflicted [but] is based upon the
assumption that the widow has voluntarily, openly, and notoriously
substituted a paramourfor her deceased husband and is supported by
him.""l

9

The provision terminating benefits for adulterous cohabitation continued to apply to widows of pre-World War I veterans until repealed
as part of the 1957 revision and consolidation of veterans' laws. 120 A
similar provision had been adopted as part of the early World War I
compensation legislation, 12 1 but was repealed and was not replaced in
1924;122 consequently it did not immediately become part of the law
ows' pensions. but digests of decisions of the Secretary of the Interior suggest them.
See, e.g., A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING THE GRANTING OF
ARMY AND NAVY PENSIONS AND BOUNTY-LAND WARRANTS; DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND RULINGS AND ORDERS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PENSIONS

THEREUNDER 416-18 (F. Curtis & W. Webster eds. 1885). In one case, the Secretary
held as follows:
[I] n determining the question of marriage the lex loci need not be considered,
for the common law would govern, and in this case, there appears to be no valid
marriage.... Where the question of remarriage of widow of a soldier is involved.
cohabitation, as a wife, with some man, estops her from obtaining a pension.
Amanda Wilbur (June 13, 1878). in id. at 416-17. See also Letter from Donald E.
Johnson, Veterans' Administrator, to Representative Olin E. Teague (June 9. 1970).
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 91-1166. 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. 19. 22. and [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3739, 3741.

116. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
117. Act of Aug. 7. 1882, ch. 438, § 2, 22 Stat. 345.
118. 13 CONG. REC. 6963 (1882) (remarks of Rep. Browne).
119. Sarah E. West, 3 Interior Dec. Pension Claims 115, 119 (1890) (emphasis
in original).
120. Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-56, § 2202(21). 71 Stat. 83.
121. Act of Oct. 6, 1917. ch. 105, § 22(5), 40 Stat. 398.
122. World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, § 600(5). 43 Stat. 607.
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governing payment of compensation to widows of veterans of the later
wars. But history sometimes repeats itself-and so it did in this
problem area.
On the rationale that widows could conceal the record of their ceremonial marriage in order to continue to receive benefits, the Veterans'
Administration adopted an administrative rule that presumed remarriage, thus placing the burden on the widow to prove continued eligibility when there was proof (1) that she was cohabiting with a man as
his wife, (2) that they were holding themselves out to the general
community as husband and wife (generally established by the requisite
cohabitation), and (3) that they had a general reputation in the community of being married to each other. 123 Faced in 1959 with an unusual court challenge to its application of the presumption to terminate
the pension of a widow, 12 4 the Administration advanced estoppel
reasoning in support of its position. Observing that neither the Administrator nor the United States had been damaged by reliance on
appellant's conduct or representation, the court brushed aside this reasoning in a dictum, stating that the Administrator's position could not
125
be reconciled with the intention of Congress.
The Veterans' Administration promptly sought congressional confirmation of its position. Congress responded in 1962 by adopting the
Administration's proposed restriction of the definition of "widow" to
require that she be one who "(in cases not involving remarriage) has
not since the death of the veteran, [and after the date of this enactment on September 9, 1962], lived with another man and held herself
out openly to the public to be the wife of such other man.' 26 The justification asserted on behalf of the proposal again related to the difficulties of proof: Although the law requires discontinuance of benefits
upon proof of remarriage, it is sometimes impossible to determine
whether there has been a remarriage, as when the woman denies that
123.
124.

H.R. REP. No. 1459, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962).
Administrators' decisions on a claim had long been nonreviewable. See, e.g.,

World War Veterans' Act, 1924, ch. 320, § 19, 43 Stat. 607, as amended by Act of
Oct. 17, 1940, ch. 893, § 11, 54 Stat. 1193. For the current form of the rule, see 38
U.S.C. § 21 1(a) (1970). For an analysis of the nonreview rule, see Rabin, Preclusion
of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans Benefits: A Preliminary
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905 (1975).

125.

126.

Sinlao v. United States, 271 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam).

Act of Sept. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-674, § 1, 76 Stat. 558 (1962). The

provision has since been amended to substitute gender-neutral terms for "widow,"
"man," and so on, and is codified at 38 U.S.C. § 101(3) (1970), as amended by (Supp.
V 1975).
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she has remarried, but lives with or has lived with a man under circumstances giving rise to an inference of marriage; information that
would lead to proving or disproving the inference is peculiarly within
the knowledge and possession of the parties involved so that it may be
impossible for the Administration to obtain the information.1 27 The
restriction was considered to be applicable to a relationship "irrespective of its period of duration, and notwithstanding that it existed in the
past and has been terminated," excepting only secretive relationships
or those which consist of "occasional short interludes (such as overnight or over a weekend), or which [are] otherwise ostensibly illicit in
nature."1 28 The restriction differs from the Administration's presumption-of-remarriage approach in not requiring a reputation of marriage
in the community. More significantly, the statutory restriction does
not incorporate an exception that the Administration had followed,
that is, the administrative presumption had not been applied in cases
wherein there could not be a legal "marriage" because of an existing
impediment such as consanguinity or a prior spouse.1 29 In order to
avoid retroactive application of the foregoing changes, the statutory
restriction was made applicable only to conduct occurring after the
date of enactment.1 30 Nevertheless, the Administrator provided assurance that the Administration would continue to apply its presumptionof-remarriage rule to cases involving husband-and-wife relationships
existing before the enactment; the Senate report acknowledged this
understanding. 131
Still a problem persisted. A 1967 court decision opened the path to
judicial review of termination cases. 13 2 In a series of suits, widows of
World War II servicemen whose benefit payments had been terminated under the administrative presumption-of-remarriage rule ob-

127. Letter from J.S. Gleason. Jr.. Veterans' Administrator, to Representative Olin
E. Teague (Aug. 21. 1961). reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1459. 87th Cong.. 2d Sess.
2,5(1962).
128. Id., reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1459, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2. 6 (1962). See
38 C.F.R. § 3.1574(c) (1975).
129. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1574 (1975); Letter from J.S. Gleason. Veterans' Administrator, to Senator Harry F. Byrd (July 30. 1962). reprinted in S. REP. No. 1842. 87th
Cong.. 2d Sess. 4 (1962). and [ 1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2592.
130. S. REP. No. 1842, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2590.

13 I.Id. at 6, reprinted in [ 1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2593.
132. Tracy v. Gleason. 379 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (overruling, inter alia, Sinlao v. United States. 271 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1959)).
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tained judgments for restoration.1 33 Slamming the door on such judicial review of the Administration's decisions as forcefully as it could,
Congress in 1970 also expressly endorsed application of the presumption in pre-1962 cases. 13 4 In the same enactment, however, Congress
also provided for restoration to the rolls of any widow who "ceases
living with another man and holding herself out openly to the public
as his wife."'135 This provision, together with the parallel provision restoring to the rolls those widows whose remarriages have been terminated by death or divorce, had been endorsed by the Administrator,
who reasoned that the same considerations made it equitable to re1 36
store benefits in both types of cases.
By providing for restoration of benefits upon proof of termination
of a meretricious relationship, Congress has removed the most punitive feature of the restriction on receipt of compensation or a pension
that began with forfeiture of a widow's pension upon proof of "adulterous cohabitation." It has also, in its most recent round with the
problem, avoided moralizing justifications. But do the justifications
advanced-the difficulties of a nonparty to a marriage proving a remarriage-support the provision adopted? A tentative answer can be
suggested at this point: The congressional provision goes further than
necessary to meet the proof problem. The administrative presumption
approach seems both substantively and semantically preferable. In the
end, one must face the moral issue posed by the estoppel reasoning on
which the Administration at one point relied: If a person holds himself
or herself out to the community to be the spouse of a person with
whom he or she lives, should he or she be permitted to deny that relationship in order to benefit in private? An alternative to answering
that question--or perhaps an unemotional basis for answering that
question-may lie in identifying the reason or reasons for providing
survivors' benefits. If the reason is to provide financial support, then
arguably the pension should be terminated only upon proof of a rela-

133. H.R. REP. No. 91-1166, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3727, 3729-30.
134. See 38 U.S.C. § 3111 (1970) (prohibiting compensation or pension payments

in cases wherein such payments would not have been made under the Administration's
standard prior to the 1962 statement).
135.
136.

Id.§ 103(d)(3).
See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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tionship that provides some basis for an assumption that substitute
137
support will be provided.
No similar provision for treatment of meretricious relationships as
remarriages has been incorporated in the insurance provisions of the
Social Security Act or the Railroad Retirement Act, discussed hereafter. Such relationships may be treated as marriages, however, for
eligibility and benefit-amount determinations under the Supplemental
Security Income title of the Social Security Act, the recently adopted
federal program providing public assistance (need-based) payments
for aged, blind, and disabled adults. 13 8 Strangely enough, under
the veterans' laws the marriage presumption is not similarly applied
for eligibility and benefit-amount determinations under the need-related, non-service-connected disability pension program for veterans.

137. The rationale suggested in the text is explored in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S.
552 (1970) (upholding HEW regulation governing state plans for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children that prohibited assumption of availability to child of income
of persons other than natural or adoptive parent or stepparent ceremonially married
to child's natural or adoptive parent and legally obligated to support under law of
general applicability), but application of the rationale in this setting would be a congressional policy decision. Although the effect of the presumed remarriage provision
is to establish a conclusive presumption of remarriage, there appears to be small possibility of attacking it under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767-75 (1975) (reviewing Court's treatment of conclusive presumptions). Given the restrictive view evidenced in the Weinberger opinion
and the broad any-reasonable-basis test established in Dandridge v. Williams. 397 U.S.
471 (1970). for review of due process challenges to social legislation discriminations
based on equal protection standards, there seems to be no basis for constitutional
challenge to many of the marginally irrational discriminations not based on sex or
illegitimacy that appear in the beneficiary definitions of federal income maintenance
legislation.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d) (Supp. V 1975). Section 1382c(d) provides in part as
follows:
In determining whether two individuals are husband and wife for purposes of this
subchapter, appropriate State law shall be applied; except that .. . (2) if a man
and woman are found to be holding themselves out to the community in which
they reside as husband and wife, they shall be so considered for purposes of this
subchapter

. ...

Existence of a presumed marriage may have substantial impact on the amount of SSI
assistance available to a couple. For example, under the original payment formula, an
eligible individual was entitled to receive a maximum of $1,752. while an eligible individual with an eligible spouse was entitled to a maximum of $2,628, id.§ 1382(b),
so that the increase in income to the couple attributable to the spouse is only half that
that it would be if the "eligible spouse" were instead treated as an "eligible individual.'
If a person treated as a spouse is not an "eligible" spouse, that person's income and
resources may be treated as included within the eligible individual's income and resources for eligibility and benefit-amount determination. Id. § 1382c(f)(1).
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II.

OASDI-THE "INSURANCE" PROVISIONS OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

The "insurance" title (OASDI) of the Social Security Act 1 39 provides monthly benefits for certain dependents of individuals who are
entitled to retirement or disability benefits (primary benefits) 14° and
for certain survivors of individuals who are "fully insured" at the time
14 1
of death.
The original old-age insurance title included no provision for such
secondary benefits. Based on an individual equity approach (benefits
directly related to contributions), 14 2 the Act did provide for lump-sum
rebates to assure approximate return of contributions for which the
contributing worker would have otherwise received no benefit. Thus,
if a person who had been required to make contributions under the
Act died before attaining the age of sixty-five, a lump-sum payment
was paid to his or her estate1 43 A person who attained age sixty-five
without having made sufficient contributions to qualify for old-age
44
benefits was entitled to a lump-sum rebate.'
The first major amendments to the Social Security Act, adopted in
1939, began to erode both the individual equity base of the old-age
insurance provisions and the rebate features of the Act. The provision
for lump-sum rebates to contributors who failed to qualify for old-age
benefits by age sixty-five was removed; lump-sum death payments

139.

42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Social

Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tit. II, 49 Stat. 620).
140. Retirement benefits may be payable to an individual who is fully insured, has
attained age 62, and has filed application for the benefits or was entitled to disability
insurance benefits for the month preceding the month in which he or she attains age

65. Id. § 402(a). Disability benefits may be payable to an individual who is insured

for such benefits and is under a "disability" as defined in the Act. Id. § 423(a). Amounts
payable are subject to reduction for earnings in excess of permitted amounts. Id. §
403(b), (f). Different rules may govern eligibility for persons aged 72 and older. Id.
88 427-428. For the definition of "fully insured," see note 141 infra. The definition of
insured status for disability benefit purposes is more complex because it also incorporates less demanding alternative coverage possibilities. Id. § 423(c).
141. A "fully insured" individual is one who had not less than one quarter of
coverage for each calendar year elapsing after the later of 1950 or the year in which

the individual attained age 21 and the earlier of the year of death or of attaining age
62, but at least six quarters of coverage or 40 quarters of coverage or, for a person
who died before 1951, six quarters of coverage. Id. § 414(a).
142. See R. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 9-10, 23-24 (1975).
143. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 203(a), 49 Stat. 620.
144. Id. § 204(a).
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were reduced. 145 Substituted were payments to specified dependents of
individuals entitled to primary benefits and to specified survivors of
individuals who died fully insured. 146 Benefit changes had been recommended by both the administering Social Security Board and by
the Advisory Council on Social Security for two stated purposes: (1)
To increase benefits for individuals retiring in the early years of the
program without substantially increasing the cost of the program; and
(2) to advance what these groups had concluded should be the primary purpose of social legislation-"to pay benefits in accordance
with the presumptive needs of the beneficiaries, rather than to make
payments to the estate of a deceased employee regardless of whether
or not he leaves dependents" 4 7-and thus to reduce the possibility
that a surviving wife or children would have to resort to public assistance or general relief.1 48 The first purpose-to increase the soon-to-bepaid benefits-was accomplished by providing monthly benefits for
aged wives and young children of retired workers.1 49 The second purpose was to be achieved by substituting monthly benefits for aged
widows, orphans, and dependent parents of deceased workers for the
prospectively large lump-sum death payments to the workers' estates. 150 The same amendments also changed the basis for old-age
benefits for insured workers from a percentage of total wage credits15 1
to a percentage of the average monthly wage, thereby effectively reducing the maximum monthly benefit for the insured from $85 to

145. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. The 1939
amendments provided for a lump-sum death payment equal to only six times the primary insurance benefit amount or PIA, that is,
the maximum retirement or other benefit (maximum PIA = $60). Id. § 202(g). In 1950 the payment was reduced to three
times the PIA (maximum PIA = $80). Social Security Act Amendments of 1950. ch.
809, § 202(i). 64 Stat. 477. By Social Security Act Amendments of 1954. ch. 1206. §
102(i)(2). 68 Stat. 1052. the death payment was reduced to the lesser of three times
the PIA (maximum = $522.80) or $255. The maximum death payment currently remains at $255. 42 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1970).
146. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666. § 202. 53 Stat. 1360.
147. Social Security Board, Proposed Changes in the Social Security Act (Dec. 30.
1938). reprinted in 2 Soc. SEC. BULL. 4. 7, Jan. 1939. See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
SOCIAL SECURITY, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 4, 76th Cong.. IstSess. (1938). The
Council, composed of representatives of labor and employer organizations. actuaries
and economists. had been appointed jointly in May 1937 by the Special Committee on
Social Security of the Senate Finance Committee and by the Social Security Board.
See A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 89-92 (1966).
148.
4 SOCIAL SECURITY BD. ANN. REP. 168 (1939).

149. H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., st Sess. 7(1939).
150. Id.; S. REP. No. 734. 76th Cong.. lstSess. 11(1939).
151. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531. § 2 02(a), 49 Stat. 620.
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$60.152 Thus, the effect of the benefit changes in the 1939 amendments was to create a pattern of family protection with some sacrifice
of individual protection. In the words of one of the influential shapers
of the social security pattern, "the new pattern of benefits had the
basic social advantage of relating the benefits to the probable need as
'1 53
indicated by the existence of dependents.'
Dependents' benefits presently include wife's, husband's, and child's
benefits.' 54 Survivors' benefits include widow's or surviving divorced
wife's benefits; widower's benefits; child's benefits; mother's, surviving
divorced mother's, or father's benefits (that is, for the mother or father
of a deceased worker's child); and parent's benefits (that is, for the
mother or father of the deceased worker). 155 The Act provides detailed definitions for each of the relationships on which a claim for
secondary benefits may be based.' 56 Although the definitions present
157
several possible bases for establishing the necessary relationship,
one common possibility is a marriage relationship or a former marriage relationship. 5 8 The eligibility definitions also require, with
152. R. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 94, Table 3.2 (1975).
153. A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 102 (1966). See
also 4 SOCIAL SECURITY B. ANN. REP. 168-69 (1939).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
155. Id. § 402(d)-(h). The Act expressly provided only for mother's benefits, not
for father's benefits, id. § 402(g), but in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975),
the Supreme Court held that the gender-based distinction stemming from the presumed dependency of the wife-mother violated the right to "equal protection" under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Treating the decision as creating a new
category of benefits, the Social Security Administration proposed a new regulation defining father's insurance benefits, "payable on the same basis and under the same conditions" as those payable within the statutory definition of "mother's insurance benefits,"
beginning March 1975, the month of the Supreme Court decision. 40 Fed. Reg. 52,738
(1975). The proposed regulations were applied on an interim basis until they were
adopted, with minor editorial changes, effective March 30, 1976, 41 id. 13,333 (1976),

and are now codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.335a-.337 (1976).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(h)(3) (parent), 416(b) (wife), 416(c) (widow), 416(d)
(1)-(3) (divorced wife), 416(e) (child), 416(0 (husband), 416(g) (widower) (1970
& Supp. V 1975).
157. For example, having mothered or fathered a child of the individual is one
basis for establishing the relationship of wife, widow, husband, or widower. Id. §
416(b)-(c), (f)-(g).
158. In some instances, the relationship must exist at a particular time. For example, the term "parent" includes a stepparent of an individual by a marriage contracted
before the individual reached age 16, id. § 402(h)(3) (1970), and the term "child"
includes a stepchild who was such- for not less than one year immediately preceding

the day on which an application for child's benefits is filed, or nine months if the insured individual is deceased, id. § 416(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For status as a
"wife," "widow," "husband," or "widower," marriage to the insured individual for not
less than one year (wife, husband) or nine months (widow, widower) preceding the
date of application is one possible basis for the spousal relationships. Id. § 416(b)-(c),
(f)-(g). The duration-of-relationship requirements of section 416(e) have been up-
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varying exceptions to be discussed, that an applicant for or recipient
1 59
of dependents' or survivors' benefits be unmarried.
The Act now provides three basic tests for determining whether a
necessary marriage relationship to an insured worker exists for
OASDI purposes. In the order in which they should be applied, they
are as follows: The valid marriage test, the intestacy devolution test,
and the legal impediment test. 1 60 The intestacy devolution test will be
discussed first, however, because it was the test adopted in 1939 when
secondary benefits were first added to the Act.
The Intestacy Devolution Test of MaritalStatus

A.

After defining the various relationships of persons entitled to receive the newly created dependents' and survivors' benefits, the 1939
amendatory act provided:
In determining whether an applicant is the wife, widow, child, or
parent of a fully insured or currently insured individual for purposes
of this title, the Board shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts
of the State [in which the insured individual was domiciled at the time
of filing, for dependent's benefits; or at the time the insured individual
held against due process challenge. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776-85
(1975) (6-3). The "divorced wife" and "surviving divorced wife" categories require
marriage to the individual for 20 years preceding the effective date of the divorce. 42
U.S.C. § 416(d)()-(2) (1970).
159. Other common requirements that will not be discussed include the following:
1. A dependency or support requirement for secondary benefits other than those payable exclusively for the benefit of certain female beneficiaries (wife's, widow's, and
mother's benefits), though by court and administrative extension, father's benefits have
also been created and drawn into this category. See note 155 supra. Thus. a child must
have been "dependent" on the insured individual at one of the times identified in the
statute to qualify for child's benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (1970). Whether a
child is dependent at one of the applicable times depends on the character of the relationship of the child to the insured individual (for example, natural or adoptive parent
or stepparent). Id. § 402(d)(3)-(4). (8)-(9) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 20 C.F.R. §
404.324-.327a (1976). A husband, widower, or parent (whether male or female) must
have been receiving at least half of his or her support from the insured individual at
specified possible times. Id. § 402(c)(1)(C) (husband). (f)(l)(D) (widower). (h)
(1)(B) (parent) (1970).
2. Age limits for all benefits except those based on the beneficiary having in his or her
care a child entitled to OASDI benefits, for example, age 62 for wife, husband, or
parent, id. § 402(b)(l)(B), (c)(1)(B). (h)(l)(A); age 60 for widow or widower or,
if under a disability, age 50-60, id. § 402(e)(l)(B), (f)(l)(B) (1970 & Supp. V
1975); for a child, under age 18. or under age 22 and a full-time student, or under a
disability before attaining age 22, id. § 402(d)(I)(B).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1) (1970).
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died, for survivor's benefits; or if the insured lacked a state domicile,
by the courts of the District of Columbia]. Applicants who according
to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a wife, widow, child or parent shall be deemed
such.1 6 1

Why the intestate devolution test was chosen was not discussed in either the Board's or Council's reports recommending the changes, 162
nor was it discussed in the congressional reports or debates other than
in the form of paraphrases of the language 6f the bill.' 63 It may, however, have been deriied from the Board's background of experience
with administration of the lump-sum rebates under the original Act.
The lump-sum rebate of contributions required by the original Social Security Act was made to the worker's estate.' 6 4 If the amount of
such a payment was $500 or less, the Board was empowered to pay it
"to the persons found by the Board to be entitled thereto under the
law of the State in which the deceased was domiciled, without the
necessity of compliance with the requirements of law with respect to
the administration of such estate.' 65 Because the early claims for
lump-sum payments were necessarily for small amounts, 66 the Board
was immediately thrust into the problems of determining the relationships of applicants to deceased workers-for example, whether a "wi161.
162.
163.

Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(m), 53 Stat. 1360.
See note 147 supra.
H. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); S. REP. No. 734, 76th Cong.,

Ist Sess. (1939).
164. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 203, 49 Stat. 620.
165. Id. § 205. This approach appears to have been derived from the approach
used in the earlier Civil Service Retirement Act. Act of May 22, 1920, ch. 195, § 11,
41 Stat. 614 (providing for payment of similar rebates to legal representatives of de-

ceased civil service employee with proviso for payment of amounts under $300 to such
person or persons as Commissioner of Pensions found to be legally entitled to proceeds of estate), as amended by Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 801, § 12, 44 Stat. 904 (increasing to $1,000 the amount payable within Commissioner's judgment). By 1934,
however, the Civil Service Retirement Act had been amended to permit payment of
rebates to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in writing by the employee and

recorded in his or her individual account, or if no such beneficiary was designated, to
the executor or administrator of the estate of such employee, or if such representative
was not appointed, to the person or persons found by the Civil Service Commission
to be legally entitled thereto. Act of June 22, 1934. ch. 711. § 2. 48 Stat. 1201. An employee had previously been given the opportunity to elect that no rebates should be

made and thus become entitled to a larger annuity. Act of May 29, 1930, ch. 349, § 4,
46 Stat. 468.

166. Payments made prior to the 1939 amendments were as follows: In 1937,
25,831 payments averaged $24.27; in 1938, 121,350 payments averaged $47.37; in 1939,
115,481 payments averaged $80.72. SOCIAL SECURITY BD., [1939] SOCIAL SECURITY
YEARBOOK 7, 10, 14.
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dow" claimant would be treated as the "widow" in the state of the
decedent's domicile for the purpose of intestate devolution of personal
property of the decedent. 167 "Plentifully sprinkled" among the applications from "widows" were those asserting that status by virtue of a
common law marriage with the deceased. 1 68 The problem of determining whether such claims should be granted was of sufficient proportion to lead attorneys in the Office of the General Counsel to the
Board to conduct an intensive study of the law of common law marriages in several states. 1 69 Furthermore, the Board was often required
to obtain opinions of the General Counsel as to the application of
1 70
state laws of inheritance, exemptions, and priorities.
Given the decisional complications engendered by reliance on the
variant state laws governing distribution of decedents' estates, it is

strange that the Board did not recommend some other approach for
use in identifying the beneficiaries of the new social security benefits.
This omission is particularly strange in light of the fact that the Board
had proposed resort to another approach in the event Congress did
not accept the recommendation to substitute payments to survivors for
the lump-sum rebates. The Board had requested that in that event the
precedent of the veterans' laws be followed-that is, the recipients of
the lump-sum payments should be expressly identified-thus elimi-

167. The grant of power was broad enough to have permitted payment in accordance with a will of the decedent. but the Board excluded that possibility in its early
regulations covering lump-sum death payments. 2 Fed. Reg. 1282-83 (1937) (requiring affirmation by applicant, if deceased left will, that law of state would not require
probate of such will and payment could lawfully be made under the intestacy law of
the state). Although the Board expressly reserved discretion not to make a payment
even though all its conditions had been met. it was undoubtedly inder substantial
pressure to make such payments to save probate expenses for estates having little or
no other assets. At one point the President recommended that death payments always
be made directly to a wife or dependent children in order to save the expense of probating estates. SOCIAL SECURITY BD.. [1939] SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK 7. There

was criticism of the "complicated and expensive requirements made necessary by the
law." C. McKINLEY & R. FRASE. LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURITY 35 (1970).

but ap-

parently the Board never seriously considered asking Congress to change the law-at
least not for 1937 and 1938. Id. at 377.
168. Billig & Lynch, Commnon-Law Marriage in Minnesota: A Problem in Social
Security, 22 MINN. L. REV. 177 (1938).

169. Id. at 179. The authors of this article were the Senior Attorney and the Claims
Attorney of the Office of the General Counsel. See also Lynch, Social Security Encounters Conmnon-Law Marriage in North Carolina, 16 N.C. L. REV. 255 (1938).
170. Some 2,500 opinions on such points were obtained in 1938. 3 SOCIAL SECURITY
Bo. ANN. REP. 35 (1938).
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nating the need for the Board to make determinations about applica1 1
tion of the state inheritance laws.
To have followed the precedent of the veterans' laws in this respect
would have been the simpler course, as the Board seems to have recognized. For example, identification of the recipients of the new benefits through a "valid" marital status (or, for children and parents,
through relationships derived therefrom) would have been in the tradition of the veterans' laws. The test adopted instead seems to have been
directed toward more precise identification of those persons probably
dependent on an insured worker and, perhaps, possible identification
of those persons whom an insured worker would probably want to
receive this new "asset,' u 7 2 thereby partaking of a property approach
as well as of a status approach. Thus viewed, the intestacy devolution
test may be regarded as a compromise between treatment of the new
social security benefits as a form of property subject to the insured
worker's control and treatment as a form of social benefit indirectly
subject to the government's control. A model for each approach was
available to the drafters of the 1939 amendments-the property-like
annuity model of the Civil Service Retirement Act 173 and the needbased welfare model of the public assistance provisions of the Social
74
Security Act.'
Under the 1934 amendments of the Civil Service Retirement Act,
rebates of contributions not exhausted in annuity payments to a federal civil service employee were payable to the person or persons designated by the employee or, in the alternative, to the deceased employee's legal representative, or to his or her estate only if the employee failed to record such a beneficiary designation in his or her
record.' 75 Similar but more limited control over beneficiary designa171. Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1939).
172. In Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976), the Court stated as follows:
[A state's intestacy law is an] embodiment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a parent would have his property devolved among his children in the
event of death, without specific directions [and] also reflects to some degree the
popular conception within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation . . . in
other circumstances, and thus something of the likelihood of actual parental support during, as well as after, life.
id. at 2766-67.
173. Act of May 29, 1930, ch. 349, 46 Stat. 468 (current version at 5 U.S.C. §§
8331-8348 (1970)).

174. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, tits. I, IV, 49 Stat. 620 (current version
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
175.

See note 165 supra.
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tion had been permitted under the World War I war risk insurance
provisions, 176 which were originally intended as a substitute for service and survivors' pensions.1 77 There would have been administrative
complications in adapting such a scheme to the new social "insurance." Nevertheless, a board and agency that could handle the gigantic task of planning and setting up accounts for and registering and
issuing employee account numbers and cards to an estimated 26 million workers17 8 could surely have provided a workable record system
for such an approach. On the other hand, the ultimate purpose of the
1939 amendments and the substantial redirection from the insurance
concepts of the original Social Security Act embodied in the 1939
amendments militated against an approach that would have permitted
the working contributors a measure of control over their contributions, thereby resulting in possible detriment to the social objective to
provide for presumed dependents. The risk of such subversion of the
social objective could have been negated by limitation of who could
be designated as beneficiary, as was done under the insurance provi1 79
sions for service personnel and veterans.
Under the welfare model of the public assistance provisions of the
Social Security Act, a dependency or need test would have been used.
There is a hint that the Social Security Board may have considered
that an actual dependency test might be appropriate, given the objective of providing benefits more in line with the needs of beneficiaries,
but chose to rely on need presumed from relationship, which would
"take account of greater presumptive need of the married couple
without requiring investigation of individual need."' 80 Rejection of a
need test might properly have been based on the dichotomy in the
176. Act of Aug. 9. 1921, ch. 57. § 26. 42 Stat. 147 (providing for payments to
estate should no person within the permitted class of beneficiaries survive the insured
or for escheat to the United States if it would otherwise escheat to a state); Act of
Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, art. IV, 40 Stat. 398 (right to designate beneficiary limited to
designation of spouse. child, grandchild, parent, brother, or sister, any or all; right of
designation could be exercised in will), as amended by Act of Dec. 24, 1919. ch. 16.
§ 13, 41 Stat. 371 (expanding permitted class of beneficiaries to include uncles, aunts.
nephews. nieces, brothers-in-law, and sisters-in-law of the insured). The Act of Oct. 6.
1917, as amended, was repealed and replaced by the consolidation, revision, and codification known as the World War Veterans' Act. 1924, ch. 320. 43 Stat. 607. and the
insurance provisions were incorporated in title III thereof.
177. 38 U.S.C.A. note at 16-17 (1959).
178.

C. McKINLEY & R. FRASE, LAUNCHING SOCIAL SECURITY ch. 6 (1970).

179. See note 176 supra.
180. Social Security Board, Proposed Changes in the Social Security Act (Dec. 30.
1938), reprinted in 2 Soc. SEC. BULL. 4,6, Jan. t939.
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Social Security Act between the "insurance," employer-employeefunded approach of title II and the public assistance, governmentfunded approach of titles I (old-age assistance) and IV (aid for dependent children) of the Social Security Act.
In any event, the intestacy devolution test was adopted; the next
question to be answered was what it meant. Did it perpetuate the rightto-inherit test inherent in the original provisions for payment of lumpsum rebates to deceased veterans' estates, or was it intended to establish a status test for dependents and survivors? Given a status test,
whether an applicant for OASDI dependents' or survivors' benefits
would actually be entitled to share in the distribution of the deceased
worker's personal estate would be irrelevant, the question instead
being whether the applicant would have the required status to so participate under some factual circumstance that need not actually exist.
In its first regulations under the 1939 amendments, the Board appeared to interpret the intestacy devolution test as establishing a status
test. Its regulations incorporated an example indicating that a wife's
waiver of a right to share in her husband's property on his decease
18 1
would be immaterial in determining whether she was his widow.
This "status" interpretation was promptly challenged and rejected by
8 2 Mrs.
both the trial and appellate courts in Kandelin v. Kandelin.1
Kandelin, concededly the "widow" of a deceased worker, had not
lived with the decedent for at least twelve years prior to his death.
Therefore, as an "abandoning spouse" under New York law, she was
disqualified to inherit from him. She applied for and was granted the
lump-sum death payment, also payable under the intestacy devolution
test at that time; this ruling was challenged on behalf of the decedent's
child. The Government argued that the 1939 amendments had been
adopted to eliminate the need for factual determinations as to the
right to share in a decedent's estate, permitting determinations to be
made on the basis of evidence about the relationship alone.18 3 The
lower court rejected this argument, reasoning in part from the policy
anomaly that under that interpretation a woman would be entitled to
benefits as a widow even if she had murdered her husband and was
"civilly dead."'1 84 The court of appeals affirmed, professing not to
181. 5 Fed. Reg. 1879-80 (1940) (Example 2, § 403.829).
182. 45 F. Supp. 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd sub nom. Kandelin v. Social Security Bd., 136 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1943).
183. Id. at 343-44.

184.

Id. at 344.

265

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 227, 1977

understand the Government's argument and emphasizing the statutory
language: "Applicants who according to such law [of intestate devolution] would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal
185
property as a wife, widow, child or parent shall be deemed such."
Under the Kandelin decision then, an applicant for dependents' or
survivors' benefits would have to be entitled to share in the distribu-

tion of at least some part of the deceased worker's personal property.
The next question to be answered was whether the applicant had to be
entitled to share in exactly the same manner as those normally occupying the status that the applicant wished to assume. The question
was answered affirmatively by a referee of the Social Security Administration, but negatively by the federal district court that reviewed the
case. A putative spouse was thus found, in Aubrey v. Folsom,186 to
have widow status for social security purposes even though she would
not share in the decedent's estate to the same extent as would a "wi187
dow" who had been validly married to the decedent.
If the Government's position in Kandelin was correct, and the intestacy devolution test was intended to eliminate questions about the
right of a prospective beneficiary of the Social Security Act to share in
the deceased worker's estate, then it is difficult to imagine a more obscure way to say that than in the language used in the statute. The
Administration found it possible to use direct language in its first regu185. 136 F.2d at 328 (emphasis added). In a 1957 amendment the "relative to"
language emphasized by the court of appeals in Kandelin was changed to "with respect to" in Act of Aug. 30, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-238, § 3(h), 71 Stat. 518 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) (1970)), but no possible reason or explanation for the
change can be found. It is assumed that no substantive change was intended by the
rephrasing.
186. 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
187. Under California law a putative spouse (a good faith participant in an invalid
marriage) may be accorded spousal status for some purposes. In Aubrey, the putative
spouse could share in distribution of property acquired by the parties during their
putative marriage, but not in any separately acquired property of the decedent. In an
earlier similar case, the court reversed denial of benefits because there was no separate
property in the estate; hence, the question did not need to be decided. Speedling v.
Hobby, 132 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1955). Whether there was or was not separate
property in the Aubrey estate was considered irrelevant. 151 F. Supp. at 839-40. For
discussions of the California putative spouse concepts, see Comment, Rights of the
Putative and Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866 (1962); Comment. Effect of State Marital Laws on " Widow's" Benefits Under the Social Security
Act, I SAN DIEGO L. REV. 76 (1964). In Aubrey the court also rejected a Government
argument that because the rule that a putative spouse was entitled to share in the estate
of the intestate putative spouse was based on equitable reasons, it was not a rule of
intestate succession within the meaning of the statute. The court concluded that California law gave the putative spouse a right of "inheritance." not an equitable right.
151 F. Supp. at 839. But see note 212 infra.
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lation interpreting the statutory provision, incorporating an example
and the statement that "[i] t is immaterial. . whether she is actually
entitled to inherit."' 8 8 In 1951 the Administration adopted a new explanation of the statute: "Whether an applicant . . . has the status of
such relative of such individual for the purpose of sharing in the latter's intestate personal property, is determined by 'applicable State
law.' "189 The Aubrey court relied on the "sharing" language. In
1962, however, the Administration amended the regulation to remove
that language' 90 and added the statement that appears in the current
regulation, according necessary status on the basis of "right to share in
[the insured worker's] estate."'191
The intestacy devolution test is of continuing significance despite
the addition of the two tests of marriage now incorporated in the Act,
hereinafter discussed. It may, for example, be substantively significant
only in making eligible for benefits those putative spouses whose cases
are not reached by the "legal impediment" test added in 1960.192
Unfortunately the legal impediment test is expressly made applicable
only after a determination that the valid marriage and intestacy devolution tests do not lead to the conclusion that an applicant has or had
the necessary relationship to the insured individual. Furthermore, by
the express language of that section, given competing applicants for
spousal benefits, one eligible under the intestacy devolution test would
prevail over one eligible under the legal impediment test.
B.

The Valid Marriage Test

Within two years of the creation of the new dependents' and survivors' benefits, the Social Security Board was cataloging the problems
flowing from the use of state law under the intestacy devolution test:
Because of the wide variation in the provisions, interpretation, and
application of such State laws, consideration of the claims of dependents or survivors of insured workers has involved administrative
complexities. These differences sometimes have made it necessary for
the Board to make opposite decisions in the cases of claimants who
188. 5 Fed. Reg. 1879-80 (1940) (Example 2, § 403.829). See note 181 and accompanying text supra.
189. 16 Fed. Reg. 13,077 (1951) (§ 404.1101) (emphasis added).
190. 27 id. 10,677 (1962).
191. See 20C.F.R. § 404.1101(a)-(c) (1976).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1970).
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lived in different States though other factors affecting family relation193
ships were substantially similar.
Thus began a series of annual recommendations for change for
"greater uniformity in defining, for purposes of the insurance system,
family relations qualifying members of a worker's family for bene9 4

fits."1

The hardship cases discussed in support of the recommendations
tended to be the "impediment" cases, those in which there was no
valid marriage, particularly wherein the parties had been ignorant of
the irregularity. 195 Under the laws of many states, no relief from
such invalidity was available through the intestacy laws:
Technical defects in marital status have denied benefits to some
women long accepted as wives by the communities in which they live.
The Board recommends that any woman who has been thus accepted
as the worker's wife receive benefits on the same basis as a legal wife
or widow, provided there is no impediment to a valid marriage at the
time she applies for benefits or at the time of her husband's death.
This provision would avoid raising issues of validity in a common-law
191
marriage of long duration.
These recommendations thus looked to validation, for purposes of the
Social Security Act, of invalid marriages. When Congress finally responded in 1957, however, it was with a provision that an applicant
would have the necessary status for benefit purposes "if the courts [of
the state of the insured worker's domicile, or of the District of Columbia if there is no state domicile] would find that such applicant
and such insured individual were validly married" at the time the applicant files for benefits (dependent) or at the time the insured indi1 97
vidual died (survivor).
No formal legislative history of the reasons for the amendment exists, in the sense of explaining the choice of the more restrictive approach than had earlier been recommended. The amendment was
193.
6 SOCIAL SECURITY BD. ANN. REP. 45 (1941). See also 8 SOCIAL SECURITY BE.
ANN. REP. 52 (1942) ("In the absence of Federal law defining the status of common-

law wife, adopted children, divorcees. separated couples, and parents, the Board must
apply the diverse provisions of the laws of 51 jurisdictions.").
194. [ 1945] FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY ANN. REP. 366. See also [ 19471 id. at 11;
[1946] id. at 429.
195. [1945] id. at 402.
196. [1946] id. at 463.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (1970).
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added as part of a floor amendment in the Senate, with ultimate
House concurrence, 198 to a bill proposed for the purpose of correcting
inequities in the application of the Social Security Act to certain
members of the Armed Forces. It was represented as having been "discussed by the [Senate Finance] Committee," and was supported by a
statement prepared "by the Department" that merely paraphrased the
language of the amendment. 199 Explanatory statements made on the
floors of both the Senate and the House were limited to assertions that
the amendment would clarify the status of widows under the Act with
respect to OASDI benefit entitlement. 20 0 In fact, the primary purpose
of the floor amendment appears to have been to remove a restriction
on availability of benefits for spouses and surviving spouses, that is,
the requirement that a spouse have been "living with" the insured
20
worker. '
The total substantive effect of the new marriage test appears to
have been only a clear rejection of the Kandelin decision, which had
made ineligible for benefits a spouse who was validly married to an insured worker, but totally disqualified to share in the worker's estate
under the controlling state intestacy laws. 202 It had (and has) also the
advantage of conceptual simplicity in comparison with the prior law,
even though the questions relating to validity of marriage are the same
as those faced under the original test.20 3 Only if a valid marriage to the
198.
199.
200.
201.
panying

202.

103 CONG. REC. 15301-02, 15530-34 (1957).
Id. at 15301.
Id. at 15301, 15534.
For discussion of the "living with" requirement, see notes 219-20 and accomtext infra.

See discussion at notes 182-85 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., Social

Security Ruling No. 64-41, 1964 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 35 (under state

law, widow claimant estopped to assert invalidity of divorce for purpose of sharing in
intestate estate, but not in establishing marriage status). Currently, the valid marriage
test may also cast doubt on the application to a "valid" spouse of the administrative

rule adopted in 1971 that denies benefits to any person who has been convicted of the

felonious and intentional homicide of the insured individual. 20 C.F.R. § 404.364
(1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1970) (rulemaking power limited to making rules

not inconsistent with subchapter). Application of the regulation to deny benefits to a
widow-mother because of the wilful homicide of her husband has recently been up-

held, Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975), but without challenge of
the kind here suggested.
203. Other questions litigated under the intestacy devolution test would undoubt-

edly have been litigated under othei marital status definitions. Such questions include
the following:

1. The validity of dissolution of a preexisting marriage. See, e.g., Magner v. Hobby,
215 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1954) (no valid marriage because Mexican divorce not recognized under New York law); Sherman v. Federal Security Agency, 166 F.2d 451 (3d

Cir. 1948) (New Jersey courts could properly find that clearly invalid divorce, pro-
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insured worker cannot be established is it necessary to go on to the
intestacy devolution test.
C.

The Legal Impediment Test

Reform, when it finally came in 1960, was anticlimactic. In justificatory language reminiscent of the Administration's earlier statements
in support of recommendations for change, both the House and
Senate committees observed: "Since the State laws governing marriage
and divorce are sometimes complex and subject to differing interpretations, a person may believe that he is validly married when he is

not. '2 04 The proposed change merited only passing reference in the
House 2 05 and no mention in the Senate, perhaps because attention was
focused on the controversial addition of grants-in-aid for medical services to the aged.
The 1960 amendment provides that if an applicant for benefits
based on a spousal relationship (wife, widow, husband, or widower)
"in good faith went through a marriage ceremony with [the insured
individual] resulting in a purported marriage between them which,
but for a legal impediment not known to the applicant at the time of
such ceremony, would have been a valid marriage," that marriage
shall be deemed to be valid, if the parties were "living in the same

cured before parties became New Jersey residents, preceded marriage of applicant to
deceased worker).
2. Standing to attack the validity of a divorce. See, e.g., Trivanovitch v. Hobby. 219
F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (applying Massachusetts estoppel theory against former
wife who had accepted benefits of invalid Mexican mail order divorce).
3. Effect of violation of restrictions on remarriage following divorce. See, e.g., Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956) (remarriage invalid in light of
Pennsylvania prohibition of remarriage by one found guilty of adultery).
4. Effect of removal of an impediment to valid marriage for parties who have in
good faith participated in an otherwise valid ceremony. See, e.g., Scalzi v. Folsom.
156 F. Supp. 838 (D.R.I. 1957) (factual question as to wife's willingness to participate
in ceremonial marriage after impediment removed); Carr v. Hobby. 125 F. Supp. 545
(D. Mass. 1954) (factual question as to whether parties had been living together at
time of removal of impediment).
5. Whether particular states recognize nonceremonial marriage as "common law'" marriage or "marriage by estoppel." See, e.g., Sanders v. Altmeyer. 58 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.
Tenn. 1944) (Tennessee law did not recognize former, and latter was doctrine applied
to determine dependency rather than relationship for workmen's compensation purposes).
204. S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3608, 3629; H.R. REP. No. 1799, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1960).
205. 106 CONG. REC. 13811 (1960). The change was similarly only summarily
mentioned in the Administrator's description of the 1960 legislative changes. See
Mitchell, Social Security Legislation in the Eighty-sixth Congress, 23 Soc. SEC. BULL.
3-4, 21, Nov. 1960.
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household" at the time of the death of the insured individual (survivor's benefits) or of the application (dependent's benefits), but only if
another person is not entitled to spousal benefits under the valid mar2 06
riage test or the intestacy devolution test.
There are parallels between this 1960 amendment and the legal
impediment provisions of the veterans' benefit law. 20 7 Both require a
marriage which would have been valid but for a legal impediment not
known to the person claiming benefits. Both require an absence of
another eligible claimant of the same class (except that only a "legal"
spouse may defeat the claimant under the veterans' laws, while under
the OASDI provision either a spouse through a valid marriage or a
person deemed to be a spouse under the intestacy devolution test may
defeat a claimant). Similarity also exists between the veterans' law
requirement of birth of a child or one year of cohabitation immediately before the death of the veteran and the OASDI requirement that
the parties have been living in the same household at the death of the
insured individual,2 08 but there the parallels end.
The OASDI provision introduces limitations not present in the veterans' law. It expressly requires a marriage "ceremony" and expressly
defines a "legal impediment" in a manner that leads to a much narrower definition than that attached to the term as used in the veterans'
law. The OASDI definition of "legal impediment" limits the term to
include only those impediments "(i) resulting from the lack of dissolution of a previous marriage or otherwise arising out of such previous
marriage or its dissolution, or (ii) resulting from a defect in the procedure followed in connection with such purported marriage. 2 09 Further, the OASDI expressly requires "good faith" and adds a seemingly
206.

42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(l)(B) (1970). Entitlement under the legal impediment

provision will end upon the Secretary's certification that another person is entitled to
spousal benefits. Id. § 405(i) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). One court has held that entitlement under the legal impediment provisions may continue to the extent the certification is not for the total spousal benefits available under the deceased worker's account,
relying on liberal construction. Rosenberg v. Richardson, 538 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1976)
(legal widow entitled only to $1.40 in widow's benefits, excess over amount of old-age
benefits she was receiving under her own account).
207. See Part I-B supra.
208. In a more complex way, the OASDI provision becomes conditioned on birth
of a child or child adoption or, in the alternative, nine months of marriage, through
the definitions of "widow" and "widower." 42 U.S.C. § 416(c), (g) (1970 & Supp. V
1975). The "wife" and "husband" definitions (for dependents' benefits) are even more
similar to the veterans' law provision in requiring, essentially, birth of a child or one
year of marriage, id. § 416(b), (f), but the veterans' law provision applies only for
purposes of survivors' benefits.
209. Id. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1970).
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repetitious statement that the provision shall not apply if the Secretary
determines that the applicant "entered into such purported marriage
with such insured individual with knowledge that it would not be a
2 10
valid marriage."
According some effect to invalid marriages entered into in good
faith is a practice derived in part from the Spanish civil law and its
"putative marriage" doctrine2 l ' and in part from a mixture of equitable, community property, and partnership principles. 2 12 The OASDI
approach does not follow any of these models. In requiring a ceremony, the OASDI provision is consistent with the civil law; but the
basis for requiring a ceremony-the Roman Catholic canon law background of the civil law 213-- has no direct relevance to the concept in
another setting,2 1 4 except perhaps to evidence the required good
210. Id. It would seem that any definition of "good faith" would require lack of
knowledge of the impediment or of the consequent invalidity of the marriage or both.
The parallel provision for establishing the "child" relationship. id. § 416(h)(l)(A).
includes none of these requirements. Eisenhauer v. Mathews, 535 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.
1976).
211. See generally, Comment, The Putative Marriage Doctrine in Louisiana, 12
Loy. L. REV. 89 (1965). The Texas court derived putative spouse concepts from an
interpretation of fragmentary reports on the Spanish Civil Code, extending the "spirit"
of a provision that legitimatized children of a good faith null marriage to import the
"civil effects of true marriages" to invalid marriages. See Smith v. Smith, I Tex. 621
(1846) (ceremony occurred while Spanish law was governing law). Following adoption of the common law in 1840, the rights of the putative spouse were limited, perhaps only to a presumption that property is acquired by the joint labors and equally
owned by such putative spouse, see Comment, The Rights of Parties to a Putative
Marriage in Property Acquired by Their Joint Efforts, I TEX. L. REV. 469 (1923).
without a right to inherit or to administer the other putative spouse's estate. I I Sw.
LJ. 245, 246 (1957) (arguing that the law of Texas in this area is now based on a
presumed partnership rather than on true putative spouse doctrine).
212.

See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 209 note. For a discussion of

the doctrine as developed in California, see Comment, Rights of the Putative and
Meretricious Spouse in California, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 866 (1962); Comment. Domestic Relations: Rights and Remedies of the Putative Spouse, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 671
(1949). The California courts have recognized a broader range of rights accruing to
putative spouses than have the Texas courts, but perhaps not the right to intestate
succession in a technical sense. Compare In re Estate of Levie. 50 Cal. App. 3d 572,
123 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1975), with In re Krone's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 2d 766, 189 P.2d
741 (1948). Cf. Aubrey v. Folsom, 151 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal. 1957). discussed at
note 187 supra. For the approach taken by the Washington court, see Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wn. 2d 550, 554 P.2d 1057 (1976) (in dicta. signalling willingness to adopt
approach of California courts for disposition of property acquired during meretricious
relationship); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wn. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); Knoll v.
Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 P. 22 (1918). For a discussion of the problems generally
faced in dividing property jointly acquired by an "unmarried" couple, see Comment.
Property Rights Between Unmarried Cohabitants, 50 IND. LJ. 389 (1975).
213. Comment, The Requirements of a Marriage Ceremony for a Putative Relationship, 4 BAYLOR L. REV. 343, 345 (1952).

214. The Texas court seems to have taken this view. Having originally required a
ceremonial marriage "attended by the formalities prescribed by law," Papoutsis v.
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faith. 2 15 In otherwise restricting "legal impediment" to defects related
to prior marriages and procedures, however, the OASDI provision
departs from the civil law model, which extends to good faith attempted marriages nullified by other restrictions on ability to marry.21 6 More significantly, so restricting the legal impediment test made
it fall short of solving the problem identified as the justification for the
1960 amendment-the complexity of state laws governing marriage
and divorce with consequent mistaken conclusions as to the validity of
marriages. It seems that the drafters of the OASDI provision lacked
the courage to "fly in the face" of the state laws restricting ability to
marry for widely variant reasons. 21 7 Such courage is necessary if a
federal policy of providing more nearly uniform treatment of persons
under the Social Security Act is to be achieved.
D.

Effect of Divorce or Separationfrom Insured Individual

Under the current veterans' compensation and pension laws, no
provision is made for a divorced spouse of a veteran; and provision is
made for a surviving spouse who was separated from a deceased veteran only in the limited circumstance that the separation "was due to
the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault" of
the spouse. 218 A restrictive approach was also taken under the Social
Trevino, 167 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), the court later held that a putative spouse would be recognized where there had been an attempted but invalid common law marriage, Hupp v. Hupp, 235 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
215. See Papoutsis v. Trevino, 167 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). The

act of obtaining a marriage license might serve this purpose, but under an administrative ruling such act is not a "marriage ceremony." Social Security Ruling No. 74-10,
1974 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 14. Cf. Santos v. Santos, 32 Cal. App. 2d 62,
89 P.2d 164 (1939) (non-English speaking persons had applied for license and then

cohabited for years; court recognized equity of dividing jointly acquired property). See
also Perez v. Finch, 320 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Wash. 1970) (decedent and widow obtained marriage license in 1960 in state that did not recognize common law marriages;
religious ceremony performed within nine months of decedent's death; denial of benefits upheld against constitutional challenge).
216.

See Comment, The Putative MarriageDoctrine in Louisiana, 12 Loy. L. REV.

89, 90-92 (1965).
217.

Cf. 42 Op. ATT'y GEN. No. 3 (June 1, 1961) (construing parallel provision

in the veterans' laws).
218. 38 U.S.C. § 101(3) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The provision is apparently directly derived from Act of May 13, 1938, ch. 214, § 3, 52 Stat. 353. At ohe point it
was held that separation and abandonment were equivalent to divorce, Mary A. Garman, 3 Interior Dec. Pension Claims 179 (1889), but this was later overruled, Lavanchia L. Salisbury, 7 Interior Dec. Pension Claims 247 (1894). It was early held
that a divorced wife could not be a widow. Mary C. Stacey, 1 Interior Dec. Pension
Claims 435 (1887); 11 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 1 (1869).
See also Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §
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Security Act when dependents' and survivors' benefits were first created, the 1939 amendments defining "wife" as one who was "living
with" the insured individual at the time of filing an application for
benefits and "widow" as one who was "living with" the insured individual at his death. 2 19 This requirement was removed without explanation in 1957 by floor amendment. 220 A "living with" requirement,
though difficult to administer, does not seem inappropriate as one test
to determine whether a legal spouse continued to have such a relationship to a primary beneficiary as to justify payment of a dependent's or
a survivor's benefit, but the fault test of the veterans' law definition is
an anachronism.
Congress first addressed the problems created by divorce in relation
to OASDI benefits in 1950, when provision was made for payment of
mother's benefits to a "former wife divorced"-that is, a divorced wife
who is the mother or adoptive mother of a deceased worker's child in
her care. 22 ' Finally, in 1965 Congress provided for payment of wife's
or widow's benefits to a divorced wife who was married to an insured
individual for a period of at least twenty years immediately prior to
the effective date of the divorce, payable even though there is another
eligible wife or widow. 222 The extension of benefits was explained ex902(16) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (defining "widow or widower" as "decedent's wife or
husband living with or dependent for support upon him or her at the time of his or
her death; or living apart for justifiable cause or by reason of his or her desertion at
such time"). "Justifiable cause" was given a broad interpretation in Thompson v. Lawson, 347 U.S. 334 (1954) (6-3), although compensation was therein denied. See also
Matthews v. Walter, 512 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Annot., 98 L. Ed. 739 (1954).
219. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 202(b). (d)-(e). 53 Stat.
1360.
220. See notes 198-99 and accompanying text supra. The supporting statement
provided by the "Department" merely reviewed the law as defining "living with" to
require that a spouse have been living in the same household with the worker or have
been receiving regular contributions from the insured individual or that the insured
individual have been under court order to contribute to her support. 103 CONG. REc.
15301 (1957). For discussions of the experience under the requirement, see R. LEVY.
T. LEwis & P. MARTIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 176 (1971); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 1082 (1958).
221. Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, §§ 101(a), 104(a), 64
Stat. 477 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(g), 416(d)(3) (1970) (terminology changed
to "surviving divorced mother")).
222. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b), (e), 416(d)(1)-(2) (1970). A support requirement
similar to that stated for the "living with" requirement was removed by Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 114. 86 Stat. 1329. Benefit amounts are
the same for divorced wives and legal wives. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2). (e)(2)(A)
(1970). Treatment of divorced wives still does not exactly parallel treatment of other
wives, and one lower court held that the differing treatment is invidiously discriminatory under the fifth amendment. de Castro v. Weinberger, 403 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Ill.
1975), rev'd sub nom. Mathews v. de Castro, 97 S.Ct. 431 (1976).
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clusively in terms of the needs of a. divorcee who had been a housewife:
It is not uncommon for a marriage to end in divorce after many
years, when the wife is too old to build up a substantial social security
earnings record even if she can find a job...
These changes would provide protection mainly for women who
have spent their lives in marriages that are dissolved when they are far
along in years-especially housewives who have not been able to work
and earn social security benefit protection of.their own .... .23
The accuracy of these statements for some cases cannot be disputed.
What the explanations ignore, however, is the stronger justification
flowing from the fact that contributions establishing the husband's "insurance" account are in part attributable to the wife's contributions.
This conclusion is more readily seen in the context of community
property law, which treats income of either spouse as income of both
spouses, so that half of all social security contributions for one spouse
are derived from the other spouse's interest. Although this interest of a
wife divorced after a long period of marriage may be recognized in
property or alimony provisions of a divorce or other decree, this possibility provides small consolation for a divorced wife whose former
husband refuses to pay or has insufficient income or property to provide the equivalent of social security dependency or survivorship benefits. Under either or both explanations for providing for divorced
wives, there is difficulty in trying to justify the all-after-twenty-yearsor-nothing-before result incorporated in the present statutory provision.
E. Effect of Marriageor Remarriageand of Terminations Thereof
1.

Effect of marriageor remarriage

OASDI eligibility definitions require that an applicant for or recipient of secondary benefits, other than a wife or husband, has not remarried or is not married, with varying exceptions for remarriages to persons entitled to specified types of OASDI benefits. For example, a
widow or a surviving divorced wife is not made ineligible for widow's
223. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 107-08, reprinted in [ 1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2047-48. Cf. note 67 and accompanying text supra.
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benefits by reason of marriage to an individual entitled to a widower's,
father's, or parent's benefits, or in most cases to an individual who has
attained age eighteen but is entitled to child's benefits because of a
disability. 224 Nor is a divorced wife made ineligible for wife's benefits
by reason of marriage to someone in one of the same benefit categories. 225 A widower's benefits are similarly protected in the event of his
remarriage. 226 After age sixty, a widow or widower may marry anyone
without termination of benefits, but payments will be reduced, as will
227
be explained hereafter.
The complex network of protected remarriages among recipients of
secondary benefits was added in 1958 to put an end to the hardship
that had resulted from the marriage of two secondary beneficiaries
under the previous law, which had required that the benefits of both
be terminated. 2 28 Another justification has been advanced by a federal
district court. 229 The court assumed that termination of secondary
224. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(3) (1970). Section 402(e)(3) is limited with respect to
marriage to a disabled recipient of child's benefits. Id. § 402(s). Reference to marriage
to an individual entitled to father's benefits is supplied by regulation at 20 C.F.R. §
404.329(b) (1976). The statutory language excepting marriage to an individual receiving child's benefits ("an individual who has attained the age of 18 and is entitled to
[child's insurance] benefits") appears to include a child over age 18 who is receiving
benefits because a full-time student, but the controlling regulation states the more limited exception stated in the text accompanying this footnote. The regulation appears
to be correct. The discrepancy in the language of the statute appears to result from
the legislative amendment sequence. The marriage exception was adopted in 1956.
when only disability-based benefits were available to a "child" over 18. Social Security
Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 101(a), 70 Stat. 807. The provision for child's benefits for full-time students, aged 18-22, was added in 1965, without express extension
of the marriage exception to the newly eligible recipients of child's benefits. See Act of
July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 306, 79 Stat. 286. A discrepancy with respect to
a disabled child's marriage is that a marriage may require denial of benefits even
though it would not have required termination of benefits already being received. See
Judkins v. Richardson, Civ. No. 72-62 (D. Ore. 1972), reprinted in Social Security
Ruling No. 73-18c, 1973 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 28. See also note 229
infra.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(3) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.314 (1976). See also 42
U.S.C. § 402(d)(5) (an individual, age 18 or older, receiving child's benefits because
of disability may continue to receive benefits after marriage to any individual receiving
either of the primary insurance benefits--old-age or disability-as well as any of the
survivors' or dependents' benefits except husband's benefits and child's benefits not based
on disability), (g)(3) (same for recipients of mother's benefits) (1970). Individuals
receiving child's benefits other than by reason of disability must remain unmarried to
maintain continued eligibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.32 l(d) (1976).
226. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(4) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.332(b) (1976).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4) (widow), (f)(5) (widower) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
228. S. REP. No. 2388, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 16, reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4218, 4233.
229. Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mo.), vacated and remanded
sub nor. Weinberger v. Jobst. 419 U.S. 811 (1974). A recipient of "child's" benefits
who suffered from cerebral palsy lost the benefits when he married another person who
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benefits upon marriage of the recipient was based on the conclusion
that the new spouse would support the former benefit recipient. If the
new spouse is also receiving benefits, the court pointed out that it
would then seem unlikely that he or she would have a source of support other than the benefits.
Nevertheless, loss of benefits through remarriage to other than secondary OASDI beneficiaries continued to work hardship, particularly
on those recipients of widow's and widower's benefits "who would like
to remarry [but] do not do so because if-they did they would lose
their social security benefits. '230 Troubling to congressional committee members, however, was the possibility that if benefits were not
terminated upon remarriage, a person receiving widow's (survivor's)
benefits-which tend to be higher than a wife's (dependent's) benefits
-could marry a person receiving primary OASDI benefits, so that the
couple would then be receiving "more than other couples would get
2 31
where the husbands had an identical record of covered earnings."
Therefore, in 1965 when Congress adopted the provision permitting
remarriage after age sixty without complete loss of benefits, it provided for a reduction in benefits intended to put older couples on a
32
par.2
Overall, the rules relating to marriage and remarriage are more
complex for OASDI benefits than for veterans' benefits, a complexity
suffered from cerebral palsy but who was receiving welfare benefits rather than OASDI
benefits. The lower court found a violation of the equal protection standards of the
fifth amendment due process clause. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded with
directions to reconsider in light of the recently adopted Supplemental Security Income
provisions of the Social Security Act, providing federal benefit payments for disabled.
blind, and aged persons. On remand, the original judgment was reinstated, the district
court finding that the Supplemental Security Income provisions do not relate to the
purposes supporting child's insurance benefits and that significant actions in the Jobst
case had been taken before the effective date of the new provisions. Jobst v. Mathews,
IA UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)

14,849 (W.D. Mo. 1976).

230. S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 109, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1943, 2049.
231. Id. Secondary benefits are computed as a percentage of the primary insurance
amount (PIA), the maximum amount of retirement or other benefit. A widow's or
widower's benefit may be 82.5% or 100% of the PIA, 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(2)(B)
(widow), (f)(3)(B) (widower) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), while a wife's or husband's
benefit is 50% of the PIA, id. § 402 (b)(2) (wife), (c)(3) (husband) (1970).
232. See id. § 402(e)(4) (widow's benefits), (f)(5) (widower's benefits) (1970
& Supp. V 1975). Such marriages.shall be "deemed not to have occurred," but the
monthly benefit will be reduced to 50% of the PIA of the deceased spouse on whose
account the widow's or widower's benefits were based. If the new spouse's PIA is greater
than the deceased spouse's PIA, she or he would be entitled to receive an amount
equal to 50% of the new spouse's PIA. Remarriages may still be inhibited in those
cases wherein the PIA of the prospective spouse is not substantially greater than that
of the deceased spouse.
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that invites mistakes and misinformation about a beneficiary's rights.
The potential for inequities is demonstrated in recent cases wherein
OASDI beneficiaries have remarried on the mistaken assurances of
Administration employees that marriage would not affect their eligibility for benefits-one remarrying twenty-six days before her sixtieth
birthday,2 33 and another remarrying fifty-five days before her sixtieth
birthday, 234 both with loss of benefits that could have been avoided by
delaying marriage until after the sixtieth birthday. In both cases, the
courts rejected estoppel arguments advanced as a basis for restoring
the lost benefits.
2.

Effect of termination of remarriage

Without giving reasons for the change, Congress in 1965 provided
for the restoration of widow's and mother's benefits and of "wife's"
benefits for divorced wives upon termination of any remarriage. The
change was effected by substituting "is not married" for "has not remarried" as an eligibility condition. 235 By 1965, federal courts had
already reached contrary conclusions about the effect of termination
of a "marriage" that had resulted in total loss of secondary benefits. If
a marriage ended with the divorce or death of the new spouse, absent
the amendment permitting restoration of eligibility, there was no basis
for arguing for such restoration. Given an annulment, however, it was
inevitable that the Administration and the courts would be faced with
the argument that the marriage had been void ab initio, thereby requiring restoration of benefits from the date of termination of eligibility. The courts' decisions and the Administration's rulings continue
to affect remarriage cases not covered by the 1965 amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first faced the problem
and concluded that state law must determine the content of the word
"remarried" as used in the OASDI eligibility definition. 236 Under the
233.
234.

Terrell v. Finch. 302 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
Goldberg v. Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y.

EMPL. INS. REP. (CCH)

1976). aff'd, IA UN-

14,934 (2d Cir. 1976).

235. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(C) (wife's benefits). (e)(1)(A) (widow's benefits).
(g)(l)(A) (mother's benefits) (1970); CONF. REP. No. 682. 89th Cong.. IstSess.
56, reprinted in [19561 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1958. 2250. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(f)(l)(A) (widower's benefits), (h)(1) (parent's benefits) (1970). the eligibility
requirement is "has not remarried" and "has not married since [the insured] individual's death."
236. Folsom v. Pearsall. 245 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1957).
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controlling California law, an annulment dcree meant that no valid
marriage had ever existed, even if the marriage had been merely voidable, but the relation-back doctrine was not applied to every merely
voidable marriage. In each case the question was whether relation
back of a decree of nullity to the date of the purported marriage conformed to sound policy. Finding workmen's compensation cases to be
most analogous, the court directed reinstatement of benefits in conformity with workmen's compensation decisions that treated an annulled marriage as invalid from the beginning. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit also determined that the relation-back doctrine
was not, under New York law, to be applied for all purposes. 237
Rather than look for analogous situations in the state law, however,
the court concluded that there could be no body of state law on the
question of whether the relation-back doctrine should be applied to
determinations relating to social security, because questions about
such determinations must always come before federal courts. Widow's
benefits, the court assumed, were provided to assure continuance of a
minimum level of support upon death of the insured husband. The
court then reasoned that by remarrying, a widow elected to accept
financial support from another husband, and Congress must therefore
have concluded that she should not thereafter be entitled to supplemental support from the social security fund. Under New York law, a
woman whose marriage was annulled could still receive alimony. Because the relationship entitled the former widow to support from the
purported "husband," the court concluded that widow's benefits
should not be restored. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
looking at Connecticut law, concluded to the contrary: The state
court had, through an annulment decree, declared a purported marriage void ab initio; acceptance of the argument that the state court's
power to award alimony should be determinative, when the court had
not awarded alimony, would always lead to refusal to recognize the
nullity of a purported marriage. 238
Sorting through the issues, the Administration initially decided to
accept the basic rationale of the Ninth Circuit court. In a ruling issued
in 1961, it concluded that (1) benefits would not be reinstated if a
remarriage was merely voidable under applicable state law and the
marriage was annulled effective only from the date of the decree; (2)
237.

238.

Nott v. Flemming, 272 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1959).

Yeager v. Flemming, 282 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1960).
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benefits would be reinstated beginning with the month of issuance of
an annulment decree, even though the marriage was merely voidable,
if the decree voided the marriage from the beginning, or ab initio; and
(3) benefits would be reinstated as of the time they were terminated if
the remarriage was proved to be void under applicable state law, with
or without a judicial decree of nullity.2 39 In 1965, drawing in part on
the rationale of the Second Circuit court, the Administration superseded that ruling with another, which provides that (1) a void marriage will not preclude or terminate entitlement to benefits; and (2) a
voidable marriage will ordinarily preclude or terminate benefits from
the date of marriage to the month in which the marriage is annulled,
but if the annulling court awards alimony or retains jurisdiction under
state law to award alimony, then entitlement to benefits terminated
2 40
because of the marriage cannot be reinstated.
If one accepts the support rationale for survivors' benefits and the
new-spouse-will-support rationale for termination of benefits upon
remarriage, then the 1965 Administration ruling seems to be based on
an equitable balancing of relevant factors. The 1965 ruling fails,
however, to address expressly a problem previously identified by the
Veterans' Administration: The laxity of some courts in granting annulment decrees and the possible fraud by some persons in seeking such
decrees. 241 Nevertheless, the 1965 ruling does not require a decree of
nullity for void marriages,- and it appears to reserve to the Administration a reconsideration of a state court's characterization of a marriage
as "voidable" through its definition of that term as denoting "a marriage which is contracted under circumstances justifying issuance of a
decree of annulment by a court of competent jurisdiction." 242 This
interpretation is given support by the Administration's recent adoption
as a ruling of a federal court of appeals opinion upholding rejection
of a state court annulment ab initio that had been entered under ques243
tionable circumstances.
239. Social Security Ruling No. 61-20, 1961 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 3.
240. Social Security Ruling No. 65-19, 1965 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 43.
241. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra.
242. Social Security Ruling No. 65-19, 1965 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 43.
243. Cairns v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1972). published as Social
Security Ruling No. 73-3c. 1973 Social Security Rulings Cum. Bull. 22. The court
held that a state court nunc pro ttnc order that purported to change rather than to
explain an annulment decree could not be given effect. In consequence, benefits could
not be reinstated for a woman who had entered into a purported marriage with a man
who, unknown to her, was still married to another. After separating from him, she
learned about his "former" wife and that his divorce had not become effective until
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III.

THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT OF 1974

The Railroad Retirement Act, both a precursor and a follower of
the Social Security Act, 2 44 tends to follow the relevant OASDI provisions of the Social Security Act very closely. In fact, the retirement
credits of railroad employees who have less than ten years of creditable railroad service and of such employees who are no longer connected with the railroad industry at the time of death are transferred
to the social security system and combined.with any OASDI credits
for benefit determinations under the provisions of the Social Security
Act. 245 Further, a substantial tier of benefits payable to qualified railroad employees or their survivors under the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1974246 is equivalent to what would be payable under the OASDI
24 7
provisions of the Social Security Act.
The 1937 Railroad Retirement Act did not directly provide
monthly benefits for dependents of retired railroad employees or for
survivors of deceased employees. Instead, it permitted an employee to
two years after her "remarriage," but three years before her separation from the man.
Under controlling state law, however, a valid common law marriage had commenced
from the time the divorce became effective. The state court had attempted to "annul"
that marriage also ab initio, but its attempt was rejected by the administrators and the
federal court. The court cited 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A) as authority for application of
state law to determine the status of the claimant as a widow, but section 416 does not
specify the law to be referred to in determining the validity of a remarriage as a terminating event. The Administration has, by ruling, adopted the general choice of law
principle that the validity of a remarriage is to be determined by the law of the place
where the marriage was contracted, "at least where such marriage takes place in the
United States." Social Security Ruling No. 64-4, 1964 Social Security Rulings Cum.
Bull. 11, 11-12.
244. The Railroad Retirement Act was originally adopted in 1934, the year before
the Social Security Act was adopted. Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283.
It was declared to be unconstitutional, Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co.,
295 U.S. 330 (1935), and was rewritten and readopted in 1935, two weeks after adoption of the Social Security Act, Railroad Retirement Act of 1935, ch. 812, 49 Stat.
967. Subjected to another constitutional challenge, it was rewritten and readopted as
the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 382, 50 Stat. 307, this version remaining in
force-though with numerous amendments---until the beginning of 1975, when it
was replaced by the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat.
1305 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-23 It (Supp. V 1975)). For a general history of the
Act and summary of its provisions, see R. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY ch. 12 (1975).
For a summary of the substantive changes effected by the 1974 Act, see Skolnik,
Restructuringthe Railroad Retirement System, 38 Soc. SEC. BULL. 23, Apr. 1975. For
an explanation of the need for the 1974 amendments, see COMMISSION ON RAILROAD
RETIREMENT, THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT SYSTEM: ITS COMING CRISIS, H.R. Doc. No.
92-350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
245. 45 U.S.C. § 23 lq (Supp. V 1975); S. REP. No. 93-1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.

54-55, reprinted in [ 1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5702, 5752.

246.
247.

45 U.S.C. §§ 231-23 It (Supp. V 1975).
S. REP. No. 93-1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [ 1974] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 5702, 5715.
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elect a joint-survivor annuity for the benefit of a spouse, irrevocable
unless the spouse predeceased the employee or the marriage was dissolved.2 48 If a joint annuity should not be elected, the Act provided
for a lump-sum death payment, essentially refunding the employee's
contributions with interest, payable to the person designated in writing
by the employee or to his or her representative.2 49 The guaranteed
refund provision, the joint-survivor election, and the provision for
employee designation of recipient of benefits under the Act were all
indicative of the extent to which the Act was regarded as establishing
a traditional industry pension plan rather than "social insurance."
That, of course, was its purpose. The railroad industry had been
among the leaders of the private pension movement until the Depression pushed the unfunded pension plans into financial trouble and
pressures became great to retire older workers to permit unemployed
younger persons to take their places. 250 Persons covered by the new
federally administered plan were removed from coverage under the
Social Security Act in 1935 because immediate payment of benefits
was considered necessary and payment of retirement benefits under
the new Social Security Act was not to begin until 1942.251 When
benefits under the Social Security Act began to outstrip those under
the Railroad Retirement Act, there was pressure to provide the same
kinds of survivors' benefits to the same classes of survivors under sub25 2
stantially the same conditions as under the Social Security Act.

Since 1946, " [p] hilosophically and structurally the railroad retirement system has tried to straddle both the social security and the staff
'253
retirement concepts.
Under the 1974 Act the system has been restructured to provide
two tiers of benefits for employees with at least ten years of creditable
railroad service and a current connection to the industry at death. The
first tier provides benefits equivalent to those under the OASDI provisions of the Social Security Act. The second tier of benefits is gov248.
249.

Railroad Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 382, § 4, 50 Stat. 307.
Id. § 5.

250.

COMMISSION ON RAILROAD RETIREMENT, THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT SYSTEM:

ITS COMING CRISIS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 472 (1972).
251. Id. at6,51, 148.
252.

Hearings on S. 293, a Bill To Amend the Railroad Retirement Act, Before a

Subcomn. on Interstate Commerce, S. Doc. No. 237. 79th Cong.. 1st Sess. 26 (1945)
(comments of Lester P. Schoene, drafter of S. 293, a predecessor of the bill ultimately
adopted).

253. COMMISSION ON RAILROAD RETIREMENT, THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT SYSTEM:
ITS COMING CRISIS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1972).
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erned by the provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act; it is in relation to these benefits that the discrepancies between the OASDI coverage and the Railroad Retirement Act are significant.
The tier of benefits available under the Act itself includes retirement and disability benefits for the employees. 254 It also provides benefits for spouses of annuitants, widows and widowers, children of deceased employees, and parents of employees who do not leave a
widow or widower or a child 25 5 on essentially the same basis as the
Social Security Act. The Act expressly incorporates the OASDI tests
for determination of family status and the OASDI definitions for the
respective survivors, 256 but not the OASDI definitions of "wife" and
"husband. '25 7 Incorporation of the OASDI family status tests has been
a feature of the Act since 1946, when it first directly provided full
258
annuity benefits for persons other than the employees.
The most significant differences from the provisions of the Social
Security Act are the absence of provisions for dependent's benefits for
children of a living employee or for a divorced spouse and the existence of an express condition of eligibility for widow's or widower's
benefits that the applicant "has not remarried."2 5 9 Failure to conform
all the benefits to those of the Social Security Act undoubtedly results
26 0
from cost consideration.
The provision for absolute termination of the Railroad Retirement
Act tier of benefits upon remarriage of a widow or widower makes
that Act, in this respect, the most restrictive of the major federal statutes providing survivorship income benefits. For example, the Civil
Service Retirement Act provides for continuation of a widow's or
widower's annuity until death or remarriage before age sixty, 26 1 with
restoration of annuity payments upon dissolution of the remarriage by
death, annulment, or divorce.262 Similar provisions were incorporated
254.

45 U.S.C. § 23 1a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).

255. Id. § 231a(c), (d)(l).
256. Id. § 231a(d)(1), (4).
257. The Railroad Retirement Act definition of "spouse" parallels the OASDI definitions of "wife" and "husband" in requiring marriage to the covered employee for
not less than one year, but exceptions to this requirement differ. See id. § 23 la(c)(3).
258. Act of July 31, 1946, ch. 709, § 5, 60 Stat. 722.
259.

260.
TEM:

45 U.S.C. § 231a(d)(1)(i)-(ii) (Supp. V 1975).

See

COMMISSION ON RAILROAD RETIREMENT, THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT SYS-

ITS COMING CRISIS, H.R. Doc. No. 92-350, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1972).

261.

5 U.S.C. § 8341(b)(3) (1970).

262. Id. § 834 1(g) (also expressly providing for restoration of payments at age 60).
An employee may direct, however, that his or her spouse not receive an annuity. Id.

§ 8339G).
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in the Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan, which was adopted in
264
was
1972.263 In 1974 the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
amended to replace an absolute termination of compensation upon
remarriage with a provision for termination only for remarriages occurring before the surviving spouse reaches age sixty, 2 65 with continuation of the provision for a lump-sum payment equal to twenty-four
times the monthly compensation upon a remarriage not so protected.
Although the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act 266 does not provide for continuation of monthly benefits to a remarried widow or dependent widower, since enactment in 1927 it has
provided for payment of two years' compensation in a lump sum upon
267
remarriage.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The four types of income maintenance legislation chosen for detailed review herein were chosen for three reasons. First, they represent a range of basic types of income maintenance legislation-from
the pre-retirement, income-replacement provisions of the veterans'
compensation laws, through the private-retirement-plan-oriented provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act and the floor-of-protection
provisions of the OASDI, to the need-based provisions of the veterans'
pension laws. Second, they rest on three basic sources of funding: The
private, employer-employee funding of the Railroad Retirement Act;
the same funding scheme for OASDI, but backed by the credit and,
potentially, the general revenues of the federal government; and the
governmental, general revenue funding of the veterans' benefits laws.
Third, Congress has recognized and occasionally attempted to take
account of the interrelation of the benefits provided under these
statutes.
Given the variant objectives and funding sources of the laws chosen
for detailed examination, variations in the basic eligibility definitions
were expected-and were found. It was also anticipated that the liber10 id. § 1450(b) (Supp. V 1975). For an explanation of the integration of the
263.
new Survivor Benefit Plan with social security benefits, see H.R. REP. No. 92-481. 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1971). For a comparison with the civil service system. see id.
at 11, 16.
264. 5U.S.C.§§ 8101-8150(1970&Supp. V 1975).
265. Id. § 8133(b)(1).
266. 33 id. §§ 901-950 (1970).
267. Id. § 909(b).
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ality of particular legislation in defining potential beneficiaries would
be directly related to the availability of governmental financing; this
hypothesis was confirmed, since the privately funded Railroad Retirement eligibility definitions are most restrictive, 2 68 while the governmentally funded veterans' laws are most expansive, reflecting the
strong lobby for the beneficiaries and the absence of a private interest
counter-lobby. Not fully anticipated, however, was the extent to which
there has been, within the last two decades, a consistent trend toward
liberalization of eligibility definitions for all the legislation discussed
in detail, as well as for the legislation discussed summarily for com-

parative purposes, excepting only the Longshoremen's and Harbor

26 9
Workers' Compensation Act.
The starting point for eligibility determinations based on spousal
relationship (as distinguished from a relationship through a child) is
the same under all the legislation reviewed. All begin with a status
test, requiring an extant valid marriage to a primary beneficiary of the
legislation at the benefit accrual time (although Congress backed into
this requirement for OASDI after starting with the slightly broader
intestacy devolution test). With or without express congressional guidance, administrators and courts have looked to the law of the place of
marriage-usually state law-for determinations as to validity of
27 0
marriages.
The veterans' benefit laws depart most substantially from the valid
marriage requirement with the liberal impediment exception, which
268. Even more restrictive is the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, the only other privately financed benefit plan that was reviewed, though only
summarily. See note 218 and note 267 and accompanying text supra.
269. See note 268 supra.
270. For the Civil Service Retirement Act, see Yarbrough v. United States. 341
F.2d 621, 623 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ("In enacting [definition section], Congress undoubtedly
left the determination of whether an employee was married or not up to the laws of
the individual states."); 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (defining "widow"
and "widower"). For the Armed Forces Survivor Benefit Plan, see 10 id. § 1447(3), (4)
(Supp. V 1975) (defining "widow" and "widower"). Although these definitions have not
yet been construed, the interpretation should be the same as that given the Civil Service Retirement Act definitions, given that the Survivor Benefit Plan was patterned after
the survivorship provisions of that Act. For the Federal Employees' Compensation
Act, see 5 id. §§ 8101(6), (11) (defining "widow" and "widower"), 8110(a) (defining
"wife" and "husband") (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (no interpretation found). For the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, see Powell v. Rogers, 496
F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1974); Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O'Leary, 328 F.2d
877, 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (" [S] ince the statute does not define the term 'surviving wife,'
and since marital status is ordinarily determined by local law, it has been assumed
that Congress intended the term to have the meaning which it is given by local law.");
33 U.S.C. § 902(16) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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recognizes good faith but imperfect "marriages" to veterans for survivors' benefit purposes. OASDI and, by incorporation of the OASDI
provisions, the Railroad Retirement Act and the Supplemental Security Income title of the Social Security Act 27 1 permit minor departures
from the valid marriage requirement, while other statutes summarily
discussed incorporate no express exceptions.
Not even the liberal veterans' benefit laws expressly validate a meretricious relationship with a veteran that has been established despite
awareness of noncompliance with marriage laws. 272 Thus, those persons who experiment with the "new" forms of marriage2 73 cannot
become entitled to the "new property" through that relationship alone.
The one statutory recognition of such a relationship to a primary beneficiary for benefit determination purposes appears in the Supplemental Security Income provisions of the Social Security Act, and
here the consequence is to reduce benefits or perhaps even to foreclose
eligibility.27 4 Nothing found evidences congressional inclination to
recognize such relationships for beneficient purposes in connection
with income maintenance legislation. Given the continuing emotional
reactions and resistance to change in state marriage laws and family
relationships, 27 5 there is no reason to suppose that Congress will recognize meretricious relationships for such beneficient purposes in the
foreseeable future.
Little concern has been evidenced for divorced spouses of primary
beneficiaries. Only OASDI provides for divorced wives of primary
beneficiaries, and then only in cases of divorce after an extended marriage. Given an increasing incidence of divorce among older couples,2 76 the provision is a useful means of protecting those older
women whose commitment to traditional roles in the marriage rela-

271. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
272. The relaxed rules of proof followed by the Veterans' Administration. however. see note 59 and accompanying text supra, may permit dishonest persons to bring
such relationships within the impediment exception.
273. Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE LJ. 441, 443 (1976).
274. See note 138 and accompanying text supra. The benefit-denying effect of the
remarriage presumption under the veterans' laws. see Part I-C-3 supra, should be
compared.
275. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note;
Levy, Introduction to A Symposium on the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 18

S.D.L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1973).
276. Foster, Marriage and Divorce in the Twilight Zone, 17 ARIZ. L. REV. 462
(1975).
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tionship has kept them from building their own OASDI accounts for
27 7
retirement and other benefits.
All the legislation discussed, both in detail and summarily, continues to provide for termination of survivors' benefits upon a surviving spouse's remarriage, but there are complex exceptions under
OASDI and a strong trend in the last decade toward abating the termination requirement when a surviving spouse reaches age sixty. Not
surprisingly, Congress has not extended this trend to the laws with the
most restrictive eligibility definitions, the Railroad Retirement Act and
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Surprisingly, however, Congress has also not extended it to the more expansive veterans' benefit laws, despite a recommendation for such
abatement of the remarriage termination rule made in connection
with recommendations, subsequently adopted, for restoration of bene27 8
fits after termination of a remarriage.
Another strong trend in the legislation reviewed is apparent in the
provisions for restoration of benefits lost as a consequence of a remarriage, upon termination of the remarriage by divorce, annulment, or
otherwise. Consistent with the trend toward no-fault divorce, 27 9 recently enacted provisions for restoration of benefits have not been
conditioned on absence of fault. In general, Congress has in fact
tended recently to avoid eligibility tests expressly based on absence of
fault or moralistic considerations, although the approval of application of the presumed remarriage rule of the Veterans' Administration
upon proof of certain meretricious relationships may evidence con28 0
tinuing moralistic concerns.
Justifications advanced on behalf of some recently liberalized eligibility definitions have tended to focus on the desirability of extension
277. This is a class of women for whom concern has been expressed in other contexts. See, e.g., text accompanying note 67 supra(termination of remarriage of veteran's

widow). See Weiztman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1190-93 (1974).
278. U.S. Veterans Advisory Comm'n, Report on the Veterans Benefits System
67-68 (Mar. 18, 1968), reprinted in Hearing Before the House Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2820-21 (1968).
279. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note; Rieke,
The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49 WASH. L. REV. 375, 377-

78 (1974).
280. For a discussion of the fault tests incorporated in the separation provisions
of the veterans' benefit laws and the L,ongshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, both provisions dating to an earlier period when Congress evidenced greater
willingness to impose moralistic conditions on receipt of governmental benefits, see
note 218 and accompanying text supra.
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of benefits to a particular class of persons rather than on how such
extension relates to the particular form of benefit being extended. One
consequence is that some necessarily arbitrary distinctions are made
to seem more arbitrary and irrational, producing constitutional chal28
lenges that seem foredoomed to failure. '
Statutory income eligibility definitions based on marital status have
been increasingly refined in the past two decades, but further refinements will be necessary. Two assumptions underlie use of marital
status as the basis for determining eligibility for statutory income benefits-that support obligations and, hence, monetary support are necessary concomitants of the status, and that replacement of lost monetary support is the basic justification for such legislation. All law-educated persons and most lay persons will recognize that the first assumption is not justified in fact in a large number of cases. As a consequence, income benefits under the federal legislation reviewed herein
may be paid to persons no longer having any real relationship, emotional or financial, to a primary beneficiary, yet may be denied to a
person completely dependent, emotionally and financially, on the
primary beneficiary. With changing mores and changing attitudes
toward marriage institutions, the number of these aberrational cases
may increase. The challenge for the future will be to discover how to
adjust the benefit eligibility definitions to reduce the number of aberrational cases without injecting a prospectively offensive case-by-case
review of dependency or a new impetus for beneficiaries to form nontraditional relationships. Of equal significance and challenge, however, will be reexamination of the second assumption. What is needed
is more precise identification of the justifications for and the objectives
of each form of legislation to guide the definition of benefits and eligibility therefor.

281.
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See note 137 supra.

